Enigma Software v. Malwarebytes by Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
No. 17-17351 
IN THE
United States Court of Appeals  
for the Ninth Circuit 





On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Northern District of California, No. 5:17-cv-02915-EJD 
District Judge Edward J. Davila 
PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING AND REHEARING EN BANC 
TYLER GRIFFIN NEWBY 
FENWICK & WEST LLP 
555 California Street, 12th Floor 
San Francisco, CA 94104 
Telephone: (415) 875-2300 
Fax: (415) 281-1350 
Email: tnewby@fenwick.com 
NEAL KUMAR KATYAL 
BENJAMIN A. FIELD 
REEDY C. SWANSON 
HOGAN LOVELLS US LLP 
555 Thirteenth Street NW 
Washington, DC 20004 
Telephone: (202) 637-5600 
Fax: (202) 637-5910 
Email: neal.katyal@hoganlovells.com 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee Malwarebytes, Inc. 
Case: 17-17351, 10/28/2019, ID: 11480086, DktEntry: 56, Page 1 of 71
brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk
provided by Santa Clara University School of Law
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... ii 
RULE 35(B) STATEMENT ...................................................................................... 1 
BACKGROUND ....................................................................................................... 3 
REASONS FOR GRANTING REHEARING .......................................................... 8 
I. THE PANEL’S DECISION CONFLICTS WITH SUPREME 
COURT AND NINTH CIRCUIT PRECEDENT ................................. 8 
II. THE PANEL’S DECISION UNDERMINES 
CONGRESSIONAL POLICY IN AN EXCEPTIONALLY 
IMPORTANT AREA OF LAW ......................................................... 15 
III. THE PANEL OPINION GIVES POOR GUIDANCE TO 
DISTRICT COURTS .......................................................................... 18 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................ 19
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
ADDENDUM 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Case: 17-17351, 10/28/2019, ID: 11480086, DktEntry: 56, Page 2 of 71
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page(s) 
CASES: 
Ariz. Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. United States,  
816 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1987) ............................................................................ 11
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc.,  
570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009), as amended (Sept. 28, 2009) ........................ 9, 14
BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton,  
549 U.S. 84 (2006) ................................................................................................ 8
Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 
511 U.S. 164 (1994) ............................................................................................ 14
Comcast Corp. v. FCC,  
600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ............................................................................ 14
Dunn v. CFTC,  
519 U.S. 465 (1997) .............................................................................................. 9
Force v. Facebook, Inc.,  
934 F.3d 53 (2d Cir. 2019) ................................................................................... 3
Loher v. Thomas,  
825 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2016) ............................................................................ 10
N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers 
Ins. Co.,  
514 U.S. 645 (1995) .............................................................................................. 8
Park ’N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc.,  
469 U.S. 189 (1985) .............................................................................................. 8
Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, No. 19-CV-340667 (Cal Super. Ct. 
Santa Clara Cty. Oct. 25, 2019) (tentative ruling) .......................................... 3, 12 
Russello v. United States,  
464 U.S. 16 (1983) .............................................................................................. 11
Case: 17-17351, 10/28/2019, ID: 11480086, DktEntry: 56, Page 3 of 71
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued 
Page(s) 
iii 
Sacramento Reg’l Cty. Sanitation Dist. v. Reilly,  
905 F.2d 1262 (9th Cir. 1990) ............................................................................ 13
Sebelius v. Cloer,  
569 U.S. 369 (2013) .............................................................................................. 8
United States v. LaCoste,  
821 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2016) ............................................................................ 18
United States v. Martin,  
438 F.3d 621 (6th Cir. 2006) .............................................................................. 10
Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc.,  
568 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2009) .....................................................................passim 
STATUTES: 
47 U.S.C. § 230 .......................................................................................................... 1 
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2)................................................................................. 1, 4, 16, 18 
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3)..................................................................................... 4, 11, 18 
47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4)........................................................................................... 4, 18 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c) ................................................................................................... 12 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) .......................................................................................... 9, 13 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) ..................................................................................passim 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B) ..................................................................................passim
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) ................................................................................................. 7 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 ............................................................passim 
Lanham Act ............................................................................................................ 6, 7 
Case: 17-17351, 10/28/2019, ID: 11480086, DktEntry: 56, Page 4 of 71




141 Cong. Rec. 22,044-45 (1995) .......................................................................... 3, 4 
OTHER AUTHORITIES: 
The American Heritage College Dictionary (3d ed. 1993) ...................................... 10 
Mario Trujillo, Computer Crimes, 56 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 615 (2019) .................... 17 
Webster’s II New College Dictionary (1995 ed.) .................................................... 10 
Case: 17-17351, 10/28/2019, ID: 11480086, DktEntry: 56, Page 5 of 71
1 
RULE 35(b) STATEMENT 
When the Internet was a new technology, Congress adopted a novel 
approach to keeping users safe from its many emerging threats.  Rather than 
embroil regulators in the near-impossible task of serving as the Internet’s police 
officers, Congress encouraged Internet users to protect themselves using 
technology to filter and disable those threats.  To spur development of such 
technology, in Section 230(c)(2)(B) of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 
(“CDA”), Congress immunized from suit providers of “the technical means to 
restrict access” to “material that the provider or user considers,” among other 
things, “objectionable.”  Control therefore was given to Internet users, who could 
choose whatever filtering technology suited their needs without the interference of 
courts.  For over twenty years, that immunity has stimulated a “vibrant and 
competitive free market” for filtering software.  47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2).  This Court 
first recognized that immunity—and its value—in Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, 
Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1173-74 (9th Cir. 2009).     
The divided panel opinion in this case strikes at the heart of the system 
Congress created.  Bypassing familiar rules of statutory construction and this 
Court’s opinion in Zango, the majority effectively rewrote Section 230 in light of 
its own (misguided) understanding of the policy interests at stake.  Specifically, the 
majority held that the statute contains an unstated exception to immunity allowing 
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a lawsuit any time a plaintiff can plausibly allege that the defendant’s filtering 
technology has some “anticompetitive” motivation.   
That exception threatens to swallow the rule.  Because malicious software 
can easily masquerade as legitimate, its developers can seek to avoid being filtered 
by filing retaliatory lawsuits that will now survive until at least summary judgment.  
And by blessing an atextual exception for “anticompetitive” filtering, the panel has 
opened the open for courts in this Circuit—which covers the epicenter of 
technological development—to fashion further exceptions inviting additional 
litigation.  Such lawsuits will impose substantial costs on bona fide security firms, 
making those firms more cautious in developing filtering tools and deterring the 
development of cutting-edge technology capable of combatting the latest threats.  
Users will have fewer choices and be less safe as a result.   
Worse still, the exception is unnecessary to address the majority’s policy 
concerns.  The majority worried that software developers would use immunity as 
cover to “stifle competition” by blocking competitors.  Add. 18.  But Congress 
anticipated this problem.  Elsewhere in the statute, it provided that the immunity 
for entities that actually “restrict access” to content applies only for actions 
“voluntarily taken in good faith.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).  By contrast, an 
entity—like Malwarebytes—that provides others the “technical means” to filter 
content poses no similar threat.  Such software leaves users in the driver seat.  
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Thus, Congress omitted the good faith requirement from Section 230(c)(2)(B)’s 
immunity for providers of filtering technology.  Giving effect to the text Congress 
enacted would therefore fully address the majority’s concerns about 
“anticompetitive blocking.”  Add. 18.            
Instead, the majority overlooked these crucial differences and swapped user 
control for regulation by courts.  That is not the system that Congress enacted or 
intended.  Indeed, the majority’s opinion is already provoking disagreement:  Just 
last week, the California Superior Court issued a tentative ruling “disagree[ing]” 
with the panel’s approach, finding that it “ignore[s] the plain language of the 
statute.”  Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, No. 19-CV-340667 (Cal. Super. Ct. Santa 
Clara Cty. Oct. 25, 2019) (tentative ruling), Add. 39.  Rehearing is necessary to 
realign this Court’s reading of Section 230 with Congress’s text and this Court’s 
precedent and stave off further conflict with state courts in this Circuit.     
BACKGROUND 
1.  The CDA emerged in 1996 as a response to the proliferation of offensive 
content on the nascent Internet.  141 Cong. Rec. 22,044-45 (1995) (statement of 
Rep. Cox).  The Senate originally proposed a somewhat blunt instrument for 
combatting the problem: imposing “civil and criminal penalties” directly on 
peddlers of “offensive material.”  Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 78 (2d Cir. 
2019) (Katzmann, C.J., concurring in part) (citing 141 Cong. Rec. 15,505 (1995)).  
Case: 17-17351, 10/28/2019, ID: 11480086, DktEntry: 56, Page 8 of 71
4 
The House recognized that this approach was unrealistic.  Because “there is just 
too much going on on the Internet,” direct government regulation would prove 
ineffective “[n]o matter how big the army of bureaucrats.”  141 Cong. Rec. 22,045 
(statement of Rep. Cox).  The House therefore proposed a more innovative 
approach that would let “Government * * * get out of the way and let parents and 
individuals” “tailor what [they] see to [their] own tastes.”  Id.
The House provision, which ultimately became Section 230, takes a two-
pronged approach.  The first prong addresses a “provider or user of an interactive 
computer service” that directly “restrict[s] access to or availability of material that 
the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively 
violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).  It 
immunizes such providers from suit for “any action voluntarily taken in good 
faith.”  Id.  The second prong—at issue here—addresses immunity for a different 
type of “provider or user”: one who acts “to enable or make available to 
information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to 
[the] material described in [sub]paragraph [A].”1 Id. § 230(c)(2)(B).  For those 
providing the “technical means” to filter content, the statute offers immunity for 
“any action,” without reference to “good faith.”    
1 The text as enacted reads “material described in paragraph (1),” but that is a typo.  
Zango, 568 F.3d at 1173 n.5.  
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Congress also included in the CDA’s text multiple competing policy goals.  
Three are relevant to this case:  (1) encouraging “the development of technologies 
which maximize user control over what information is received,” 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(b)(3); (2) removing “disincentives for the development and utilization of 
blocking and filtering technologies,” id. § 230(b)(4); and (3) preserving “the 
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other 
interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation,” id.
§ 230(b)(2).       
2.  Malwarebytes, Inc. is a leading Internet security firm.  Add. 10.  Users 
download its software to protect themselves from a wide array of threats on the 
Internet, including “malware,” which can damage operating systems or steal user 
information, and “potentially unwanted programs” (or “PUPs”) that deceive users 
into thinking something is wrong with their computer so that they will download 
premium, paid products to combat the supposed threats.  When Malwarebytes’s 
software detects a threat, it disables the program, notifies the user, and offers the 
option to retain, quarantine, or remove the offending material.  See Excerpts of 
Record (“ER”) 39-46.  In other words, users make the final decision about what 
gets filtered.       
In October 2016, employing its experience and judgment, Malwarebytes 
adopted new criteria for what it considers a PUP.  ER 38.  Using those criteria, 
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Malwarebytes’s software began classifying certain products of plaintiff Enigma 
Software Group as PUPs.  Add. 11.  As with any PUP, Malwarebytes’s software 
gave users the option to retain or remove Enigma’s programs, although Enigma 
alleges that some users might find retaining the programs technically challenging.  
See ER 39-46.  
Enigma sued Malwarebytes, alleging state-law business torts and unfair 
advertising in violation of the Lanham Act.  ER 55-60.  Malwarebytes moved to 
dismiss, invoking Section 230(c)(2)(B)’s immunity for providers of filtering 
software.  Add. 12.  Enigma opposed the motion, claiming that Malwarebytes’s 
PUP criteria revision was part of an “anti-competitive, predatory scheme to 
deliberately injure” Enigma and that immunity is unavailable under such 
circumstances.  ER 27.      
The District Court agreed with Malwarebytes, concluding that this case was 
“factually indistinguishable” from the situation this Court confronted in Zango.  
ER 6.  In that case, another Internet security firm had been sued on a theory similar 
to Enigma’s.  Zango, 568 F.3d at 1172.  This Court held that the security firm was 
entitled to claim Section 230(c)(2)(B)’s immunity for “a provider of software or 
enabling tools that filter, screen, allow, or disallow content that the provider or user 
considers * * * objectionable.”  Id. at 1173.  Seeing no material difference between 
Malwarebytes and the Zango defendant, the District Court applied the same 
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immunity here.  The court also rejected Enigma’s argument that Section 
230(c)(2)(B) immunity requires “good faith.”  Examining the statute’s text, the 
court emphasized that the adjacent provision—providing immunity for those who 
actually “restrict access to or availability of material”—included a good faith 
requirement.  ER 4 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A)).  “Congress could have 
included a similar reference in sub[paragraph] (B),” the District Court explained, 
“but it chose not to.”  ER 7.  The court therefore held Malwarebytes immune. 
A divided panel of this Court reversed.  The majority did not read Zango to 
address whether there are “limitations * * * on the ability of a filtering software 
provider to block users from receiving online programming.”  Add. 16.  And it 
thought that the “CDA’s history and purpose” favored reading an implied 
limitation into the statute when a firm allegedly acts with “anticompetitive 
motives.”  Id. at 17.  Finding that “Enigma has specifically alleged that the 
blocking here was anticompetitive,” the majority held that the lawsuit cannot be 
dismissed at this stage.2 Id. at 20.    
Judge Rawlinson dissented.  “[T]he ‘broad language’ of the Act,” she 
explained, “bestows immunity” “if the blocked content is ‘otherwise objectionable’ 
to the provider.”  Id. at 25 (quoting Zango, 568 F.3d at 1173).  Judge Rawlinson 
2 Separately, the panel held that Enigma’s allegation of unfair advertising under the 
Lanham Act does not fall within the CDA’s exception for claims “pertaining to 
intellectual property.”  Add. 21 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2)).  Malwarebytes 
takes no issue with that holding.   
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also found the majority’s narrow approach to immunity to be “in conflict” with this 
Court’s recognition in Zango that the “broad language of the Act is consistent with 
‘the Congressional goals for immunity.’”  Id. at 25 (quoting Zango, 568 F.3d at 
1174).   
REASONS FOR GRANTING REHEARING 
I. THE PANEL’S DECISION CONFLICTS WITH SUPREME COURT 
AND NINTH CIRCUIT PRECEDENT. 
Under standard rules of statutory construction, Malwarebytes is entitled to 
immunity under Section 230(c)(2)(B).  The majority reached a contrary conclusion 
only by leaving aside the statute’s text and undertaking a misguided policymaking 
exercise.  The resulting interpretation cannot be squared with Zango’s reading of 
the statute.   
1.  “[I]n any statutory construction case,” a court must “‘start, of course, 
with the statutory text.’”  Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 376 (2013) (quoting BP 
Am. Prod. Co. v. Burton, 549 U.S. 84, 91 (2006)); see also Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. 
Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 194 (1985) (“Statutory construction must 
begin with the language employed by Congress and the assumption that the 
ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose.”).  
Only after examining “the text of the provision in question” will the court “move 
on, as need be, to the structure and purpose of the Act in which it occurs.”  N.Y. 
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 
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U.S. 645, 655 (1995).  Even then, courts must cautiously wade into policy disputes 
as they “[l]ack[] the expertise or authority to assess the[] important competing 
claims” involved in such debates, which are “best addressed to the Congress.”  
Dunn v. CFTC, 519 U.S. 465, 480 (1997).  Thus, this Court has recognized that 
even when “the statutory language declares” Congress’s “goals,” courts still “must 
closely hew to the text of the” “operative section of the” law.  Barnes v. Yahoo!, 
Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100 (9th Cir. 2009), as amended (Sept. 28, 2009).        
Following those rules here, Malwarebytes’s alleged actions fall within 
Section 230(c)(2)(B)’s protection for providers of filtering technology.  That 
provision immunizes (1) “a provider or user of an interactive computer service” 
that offers (2) to “others” the “technical means to restrict access” to “material” that 
(3) “the provider or user considers * * * harassing[] or otherwise objectionable.”  
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).  The first element is undisputed; Enigma agrees that 
Malwarebytes is a “provider of an interactive computer service.”  Id.; see ER 23.  
It is equally obvious that Malwarebytes provides “others” “the technical means to 
restrict access” to online “material.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B).  As Enigma’s 
complaint alleges, Malwarebytes’s program works by “detecting * * * malware or 
other computer threats, reporting to the user the results of the detection, and then 
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taking remedial action * * * or providing the user with an option to remove the 
detected program.”  ER 34.3
That leaves only whether Enigma’s software is “material” that a “provider” 
(here, Malwarebytes) or a “user considers to be * * * objectionable.” 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(c)(2)(A).  Enigma’s own Complaint answers that question in the affirmative, 
conceding that Malwarebytes “identif[ies]” Enigma’s products “as PUPs and 
‘threats.’”  ER 24.   That subjective determination is enough.  Congress carefully 
chose its words to enact a subjective test, providing immunity for material that the 
provider “considers to be” objectionable, rather than material that “is” 
objectionable.  Cf. United States v. Martin, 438 F.3d 621, 630 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(phrase “considers to be” connotes “discretion”).  That is exactly how Zango read 
the statute.  568 F.3d at 1173 (immunity covers “material that the user or the 
provider deems objectionable” (emphasis altered)).  And the word “objectionable” 
is easily capacious enough to encompass programs that Malwarebytes has deemed 
“a threat” or a “potentially unwanted program.”  See, e.g., Webster’s II New 
College Dictionary (1995 ed.) (defining “objectionable” as “[p]rovoking 
disapproval or opposition: offensive”); The American Heritage College Dictionary 
(3d ed. 1993) (similar definition).    
3 Enigma attempted to contest this element before the panel, but “forfeit[ed] * * * 
[the] issue” by failing to “complain of [it] in the district court.”  Loher v. Thomas, 
825 F.3d 1103, 1121 (9th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
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Enigma has repeatedly argued that, to qualify for immunity, Malwarebytes 
must have acted in “good faith”—and, therefore, without anticompetitive animus—
when it deemed Enigma’s products a PUP.  But Section 230(c)(2)(B)’s language 
contains no such requirement.  That choice was plainly intentional:  The 
neighboring provision in subparagraph (A)—which applies to entities that directly 
“restrict access” to content—immunizes only “action[s] voluntarily taken in good 
faith.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).  No similarly constraining language appears in 
Section 230(c)(2)(B).  “Where Congress includes particular language in one 
section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally 
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion 
or exclusion.”  Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (internal 
quotation marks and alteration omitted); see also Ariz. Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v.
United States, 816 F.2d 1366, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987) (same).   
The differential treatment of immunity in subparagraphs (A) and (B) accords 
with the statute’s policy goals.  It “encourage[s] the development of technologies 
that maximize user control,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3), by immunizing providers of 
such tools—such as Malwarebytes—regardless of motive.  Cf. Zango, 568 F.3d at 
1174 (“[A]ffording the safe harbor to providers of anti-malware software aligns 
with the Congressional policy” by encouraging “the development of software that 
filters out objectionable * * * material[.]”).  But, to prevent misuse of those tools, 
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Congress also required those who actually restrict content—for example, a social 
media site that removes an offensive post—to behave as “Good Samaritans,” id.
§ 230(c), by acting in “good faith,” id. § 230(c)(2)(A).  
2.  The majority opinion reached a different conclusion by failing to follow 
the usual order of operations for statutory construction; instead, its analysis began 
and ended with “the CDA’s history and purpose.”  Add. 17.  Relying on those 
factors, it concluded that Section 230(c)(2)(B) contains an unstated exception for 
anticompetitive conduct.  Id.  In effect, then, the majority imposed on Section 
230(c)(2)(B) the very good-faith requirement that Congress omitted.  See Prager, 
Case No. 19-CV-340667, Add. 39 (majority “ignore[d] the plain language of the 
statute by reading a good faith limitation into section 230(c)(2)(B)”).  As Judge 
Rawlinson explained in dissent, the panel had to disregard the CDA’s text to reach 
that result.  Add. 24-25. 
The majority never expressly identifies any basis in the text for a motive-
based exception.  It implies, however, that the exception derives from the meaning 
of “objectionable.”  See id. at 20 (“We conclude only that if a provider’s basis for 
objecting and seeking to block materials is because those materials benefit a 
competitor, the objection would not fall within any category listed in the statute 
and the immunity would not apply.”).  But the majority made no effort to explain 
how such a limitation comports with the plain (and broad) meaning of 
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“objectionable.”  It cited no definition or precedent construing that word, and, as 
Judge Rawlinson pointed out, its “conclusion cannot be squared with the broad 
language of the Act.”  Id. at 25.  Stranger still, it found that the only textual 
argument it considered favored Malwarebytes.  Id. at 18.  Enigma had urged the 
Court to employ the canon of ejusdem generis to give “objectionable” a restrictive 
meaning in light of the six adjectives listed before it.  See id. at 18-20. The 
majority rightly recognized that the canon is inappropriate here because “the 
specific categories listed in § 230(c)(2) vary greatly,” and when “enumerated 
categories are not similar, they provide little or no assistance in interpreting the 
more general category.”  Id. at 19 (citing Sacramento Reg’l Cty. Sanitation Dist. v. 
Reilly, 905 F.2d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 1990)).   
Finally, despite extensive briefing from both sides on the issue, the majority 
said nothing about Enigma’s argument that subparagraph (A)’s “good faith” 
requirement should be read as “implied” in subparagraph (B).  Enigma Opening 
Br. 42.  Indeed, throughout its analysis, the majority cites the operative provision 
simply as “Section 230(c)(2),” completely effacing the textual differences between 
subparagraphs (A) and (B).   
Under binding precedent from the Supreme Court and this Circuit, the 
majority’s approach of bypassing the statutory text in favor of pure policy analysis 
was error.  “Policy considerations cannot override * * * interpretation of the text 
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and structure of the Act[.]”  Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of 
Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 188 (1994).  That holds true even where, as here, 
Congress listed goals in the statutory text:  In the context of this very statute, this 
Court has required “closely hew[ing] to the text of the statutory bar on liability” 
rather than focusing on the prefatory “goals.”  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1100.  Such 
policy statements cannot replace the statute’s “operative” text.  Id.; see also 
Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“[U]nder Supreme 
Court * * * case law statements of policy, by themselves, do not create statutorily 
mandated responsibilities.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
3.  Compounding the majority’s problems, the panel opinion also conflicts 
with Zango.  There, this Court read the CDA to create a subjective test for what is 
“objectionable,” affording immunity so long as the provider or user “deems” the 
filtered material “objectionable.”  568 F.3d at 1173 (emphasis added).  The 
majority here scuttles that approach in favor of an objective test, in which a court 
must determine whether the material is in fact “objectionable” by reference to 
some external standard.  Add. 16.  The majority thought it could reconcile the two 
cases by framing the issue here as whether the statute imposes “limitations * * * on 
the ability of a filtering software provider” to deem material objectionable.  Id.; see 
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Zango, 568 F.3d at 1177 n.8.  But such limitations must operate within the 
subjective framework that Zango established.4  The majority’s does not.        
Moreover, as Judge Rawlinson pointed out, the majority opinion is “in 
conflict with” Zango’s “recognition * * * that the broad language of the Act is 
consistent with ‘the Congressional goals for immunity’ as expressed in the 
language of the statute.”  Add. 25 (quoting Zango, 568 F.3d at 1174).  The 
majority sidesteps that charge by claiming the equities in this case differ because 
this case “involves direct competitors.”  Id. at 17.  But Judge Rawlinson correctly 
observed that this distinction is illusory, as “the plaintiff in Zango asserted similar 
anticompetition effects.”  Id. at 25; see also Reply Br. of Appellant at 10, Zango, 
568 F.3d 1169 (No. 07-35800) (asserting that the “fundamental deprivation of 
consumer choice, with resultant harm to Zango, [was] at the heart of [that] suit”).     
II. THE PANEL’S DECISION UNDERMINES CONGRESSIONAL 
POLICY IN AN EXCEPTIONALLY IMPORTANT AREA OF LAW. 
Even if the majority’s focus on policy could be squared with precedent—and 
it cannot—the majority profoundly misinterpreted how Congress’s policy 
4 For example, in an appropriate case, the “good faith” requirement in 
subparagraph (A) might accomplish this by assuring that a provider reaches its 
determination in “good faith.”  Of course, as Malwarebytes has explained, that 
limitation is unavailable in this case, which involves subparagraph (B) immunity.  
Cf. Zango, 568 F.3d at 1177 (noting that “subparagraph (B) * * * has no good faith 
language”).      
Case: 17-17351, 10/28/2019, ID: 11480086, DktEntry: 56, Page 20 of 71
16 
considerations apply in this case.  Its errors threaten grave consequences for the 
future of Internet security.   
1.  The majority believed that its result flowed from the CDA’s enumerated 
policy goals.  Seizing especially on one of those goals—preserving “the vibrant 
and competitive free market” for “Internet * * * services,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2)—
the majority expressed concern that providers would rely on “unbridled discretion 
to block online content” to “drive each other out of business.”  Add. 17-18.  In the 
majority’s view, users would be powerless bystanders with no choice but to “trust 
that the provider will block material consistent with that user’s desires.”  Id. at 18.  
Judge Fisher, concurring in Zango, expressed a similar concern that crafty 
providers “could employ their software to block content for anticompetitive 
purposes without the user’s knowledge.”  568 F.3d at 1179.   
But, as Malwarebytes has explained, if the majority actually heeded the 
textual differences between subparagraphs (A) and (B), it would have no need to 
worry.  The kind of immunity that Malwarebytes relies on could not immunize the 
kind of “covert, anti-competitive blocking” that troubled Judge Fisher, id., and the 
majority, Add. 18.  That immunity applies only to entities that provide “others the 
technical means” to filter content.  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added).  If 
those “others”—in this case, individual users—are unsatisfied with 
Malwarebytes’s filtering technology, they are free to choose a different product.     
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2.  By replacing the scheme that Congress enacted with one of its own 
devising, the majority has undermined Congress’s stated goals.  The majority 
failed to appreciate that many purveyors of unwanted content on the Internet—
from deceptive PUPs to viruses to spyware—often pose as legitimate security 
software.  See Mario Trujillo, Computer Crimes, 56 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 615, 622 
(2019).  Many developers of malicious software subjected to filtering can therefore 
retaliate by filing lawsuits.   
Under the majority’s rule, as long a plaintiff can craft allegations that 
survive relatively minimal pleading standards, the case must proceed at least 
through discovery to summary judgment.5  The constant looming threat of costly 
litigation will chill legitimate security firms from developing technologies capable 
of filtering the latest threats.  As a result, their products will be less competitive 
and users will have reduced control over the material they receive.  Cf. Zango, 568 
F.3d at 1174 (noting that “more software” for “block[ing] malware” means “more 
control over the content” for “users”).  Thus, the majority’s approach actually 
erects “disincentives for the development * * * of blocking and filtering 
technologies,” thereby reducing “user control” over the flow of information and 
5 The majority exacerbates this problem by setting an extremely low bar for what a 
putative competitor must allege.  It accepts at face value Enigma’s claims of 
“anticompetitive” action without listing any specific facts to support that claim.  
Add. 20.  Any number of future plaintiffs can easily parrot such threadbare 
allegations.   
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stifling the “vibrant and competitive free market” for filtration tools.  47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(b)(2)-(4).   
The consequences will be widely felt.  The “Internet is vital for a wide range 
of routine activities in today’s world[.]”  United States v. LaCoste, 821 F.3d 1187, 
1191 (9th Cir. 2016).  Its users need tools to protect themselves from a constantly 
evolving host of threats.  The majority’s opinion instead rewards developers who 
take advantage of users by peddling malware in the guise of security software 
while hindering legitimate security programs from combating such deceptive 
actors.  That completely inverts the incentives that Congress sought to create—a 
result that is particularly troubling given this Circuit’s status as a hub for 
technological development.   
III. THE PANEL OPINION GIVES POOR GUIDANCE TO DISTRICT 
COURTS. 
Finally, the majority opinion contains language likely to confuse lower 
courts and spawn even more litigation.  Although the majority’s reasoning focuses 
chiefly on “anticompetitive” conduct, Add. 20, the opinion also suggests that the 
statute requires a provider to filter content “based on the characteristics of the 
online material, i.e. its content, and not on the identity of the entity that produced 
it,” id. at 10.  That sweeping formulation exposes providers to liability for far more 
than merely anticompetitive conduct.  Bad actors are constantly devising new ways 
to infiltrate computer systems.  Read literally, this statement would authorize 
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litigation if an anti-spyware program blocks new content from a known hacker or if 
anti-spam filters block mail from a known spammer without assessing each 
individual email.  That cannot be the law.  Even if the en banc Court denies review, 
Malwarebytes urges the panel to grant rehearing to strike this sentence from the 
opinion.   
CONCLUSION 
The petition for panel rehearing and rehearing en banc should be granted. 
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Opinion by Judge Schroeder;
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Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.
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SUMMARY**
Communications Decency Act
The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal, as barred
by § 230 of the Communications Decency Act, of claims
under New York law and the Lanham Act’s false advertising
provision.
Enigma Software Group USA, LLC, and Malwarebytes,
Inc., were providers of software that helped internet users to
filter unwanted content from their computers.  Enigma
alleged that Malwarebytes configured its software to block
users from accessing Enigma’s software in order to divert
Enigma’s customers.
Section 230 immunizes software providers from liability
for actions taken to help users block certain types of
unwanted online material, including material that is of a
violent or sexual nature or is “otherwise objectionable.” 
Distinguishing Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d
1169 (9th Cir. 2009), the panel held that the phrase
“otherwise objectionable” does not include software that the
provider finds objectionable for anticompetitive reasons.  As
to the state-law claims, the panel held that Enigma’s
allegations of anticompetitive animus were sufficient to
withstand dismissal.  As to the federal claim, the panel further
held that § 230’s exception for intellectual property claims
did not apply because this false advertising claim did not
** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court.  It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
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relate to trademarks or any other type of intellectual property. 
The panel remanded the case for further proceedings.
Dissenting, Judge Rawlinson wrote that § 230 is broadly
worded, and Enigma did not persuasively make a case for
limitation of the statute beyond its provisions.
COUNSEL
Terry Budd (argued), Budd Law PLLC, Wexford,
Pennsylvania; Christopher M. Verdini and Anna Shabalov,
K&L Gates LLP, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Edward P.
Sangster, K&L Gates LLP, San Francisco, California; for
Plaintiff-Appellant.
Tyler G. Newby (argued), Guinevere L. Jobson, and Sapna





This dispute concerns § 230, the so-called “Good
Samaritan” provision of the Communications Decency Act of
1996, enacted primarily to protect minors from harmful
online viewing.  The provision immunizes computer-software
providers from liability for actions taken to help users block
certain types of unwanted, online material.  The provision
expressly describes material of a violent or sexual nature, but
Add. 3
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also includes a catchall for material that is “otherwise
objectionable.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).  We have previously
recognized that the provision establishes a subjective standard
whereby internet users and software providers decide what
online material is objectionable.  See Zango Inc. v. Kaspersky
Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1173 (9th Cir. 2009).
The parties to this dispute are both providers of software
that help internet users filter unwanted content from their
computers.  Plaintiff-Appellant Enigma Software Group
USA, LLC has alleged violations of New York state law and
a violation of the Lanham Act’s false advertising provision. 
Each claim is based on the allegation that defendant,
Malwarebytes Inc., has configured its software to block users
from accessing Enigma’s software in order to divert Enigma’s
customers.  The district court, relying on Zango, dismissed
the action as barred by § 230’s broad recognition of
immunity.  We did not hold in Zango, however, that the
immunity was limitless.
This case differs from Zango in that here the parties are
competitors.  In this appeal Enigma contends that the
“otherwise objectionable” catchall is not broad enough to
encompass a provider’s objection to a rival’s software in
order to suppress competition.  Enigma points to Judge
Fisher’s concurrence in Zango warning against an overly
expansive interpretation of the provision that could lead to
anticompetitive results.  We heed that warning and reverse
the district court’s decision that read Zango to require such an
interpretation.  We hold that the phrase “otherwise
objectionable” does not include software that the provider
finds objectionable for anticompetitive reasons.
Add. 4
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Malwarebytes contends that it had legitimate reasons for
finding Enigma’s software objectionable apart from any
anticompetitive effect, and that immunity should therefore
apply on Enigma’s state-law claims, even if the district court
erred in its interpretation of Zango.  We conclude, however,
that Enigma’s allegations of anticompetitive animus are
sufficient to withstand dismissal.
Enigma’s federal claim warrants an additional analytical
step.  The CDA’s immunity provision contains an exception
for intellectual property claims, stating that “[n]othing in this
section shall be construed to limit or expand any law
pertaining to intellectual property.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2). 
Enigma has brought a false advertising claim under the
Lanham Act, a federal statute that deals with trademarks. 
Enigma contends that the false advertising claim is one
“pertaining to intellectual property” and thus outside the
scope of § 230 immunity.
Although it is true that the Lanham Act itself deals with
intellectual property, i.e. trademarks, Enigma’s false
advertising claim does not relate to trademarks or any other
type of intellectual property.  The district court therefore
correctly held that the intellectual property exception to
immunity does not apply to the false advertising claim.  The
district court went on to hold that under Zango’s application
of § 230 immunity, Malwarebytes was immune from liability
for false advertising.  As with Enigma’s state law claims, we
hold that the district court read Zango too broadly in
dismissing the federal claim.  We therefore reverse the
judgment on this claim as well.
Add. 5
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STATUTORY BACKGROUND
This appeal centers on the immunity provision contained
in § 230(c)(2) of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”),
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1996).  The CDA, which was enacted as
part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, contains this
“Good Samaritan” provision that, in subparagraph B,
immunizes internet-service providers from liability for giving
internet users the technical means to restrict access to the
types of material described in the subparagraph A.  Id.
§ 230(c)(2)(B).  The material, as described in that
subparagraph, is “material that the provider or user considers
to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable.”  Id. § 230(c)(2)(A).1
1 Section 230(c) is entitled “Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking
and screening of offensive material.”  The relevant subsection (2), “Civil
liability,” states, in full, as follows:
“No provider or user of an interactive computer service
shall be held liable on account of –
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict
access to or availability of material that the provider or
user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy,
excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable, whether or not such material is
constitutionally protected; or
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to
information content providers or others the technical
means to restrict access to material described in
paragraph [A].”
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A), (B).
Add. 6
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This grant of immunity dates back to the early days of the
internet when concerns first arose about children being able
to access online pornography.  Parents could not program
their computers to block online pornography, and this was at
least partially due to a combination of trial court decisions in
New York that had deterred the creation of online-filtration
efforts.  In the first case, Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., a
federal court held that passive providers of online services
and content were not charged with knowledge of, or
responsibility for, the content on their network.  See 776 F.
Supp 135, 139–43 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).  Therefore, if a provider
remained passive and uninvolved in filtering third-party
material from its network, the provider could not be held
liable for any offensive content it carried from third parties. 
See id.
The corollary of this rule, as later articulated by a New
York state trial court, was that once a service provider
undertook to filter offensive content from its network, it
assumed responsibility for any offensive content it failed to
filter, even if it lacked knowledge of the content.  See Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co., 1995 WL 323710, *5
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (“Prodigy’s conscious choice,
to gain the benefits of editorial control, has opened it up to a
greater liability than CompuServe and other computer
networks that make no such choice.”), superseded by statute,
Communications Decency Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110
Stat. 137, as recognized in Shiamili v. Real Estate Group of
N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011 (2011).  Representative Chris
Cox warned during debates on proposed legislation aimed at
overruling Stratton Oakmont, that premising liability on
providers’ efforts to filter out offensive material was
deterring software companies from providing the filtering
software and tools that could help parents block pornography
Add. 7
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and other offensive material from their home computers.  See
141 Cong. Rec. 22,045 (1995) (statement of Rep. Cox).
The Stratton Oakmont decision, along with the increasing
public concern about pornography on the internet, served as
catalysts for legislators to consider greater internet regulation. 
Congress considered, in early 1995, two different
amendments to the Telecommunications Act.  The first,
called the Exon-Coats amendment, targeted pornography at
the source by prohibiting its dissemination.  See id. at 16,068. 
Proponents of this bill argued that parents lacked the
technological sophistication needed to implement online-
filtration tools and that the government therefore needed to
step in.  Id. at 16,099.  The second proposal, entitled the
Online Family Empowerment Act (“OFEA”), targeted
internet pornography at the receiving end by encouraging
further development of filtration tools.  Id. at 22,044. 
Proponents of this bill pointed out that prohibiting
pornography at the source raised constitutional issues
involving prior restraint, and argued that parents, not
government bureaucrats, were better positioned to protect
their children from offensive online material.  Id. at 16,013.
On February 1, 1996, Congress enacted both approaches
as part of the CDA.  The Exon-Coats amendment was
codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223, but was later invalidated by Reno
v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 877–79 (1997).  Before us is OFEA’s
approach, enacted as § 230(c)(2) of the CDA.  See Pub L. No.
104-104, § 509, 110 Stat. 56, 137–39.  By immunizing
internet-service providers from liability for any action taken
to block, or help users block offensive and objectionable
online content, Congress overruled Stratton Oakmont and
thereby encouraged the development of more sophisticated
Add. 8
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methods of online filtration.  See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-
879, at 194 (1996).
The history of § 230(c)(2) shows that access to
pornography was Congress’s motivating concern, but the
language used in § 230 included much more, covering any
online material considered to be “excessively violent,
harassing, or otherwise objectionable.”  See 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(2)(A)–(B).  Perhaps to guide the interpretation of
this broad language, Congress took the rather unusual step of
setting forth policy goals in the immediately preceding
paragraph of the statute.  See id. § 230(b).  Of the five goals,
three are particularly relevant here.  These goals were “to
encourage the development of technologies which maximize
user control”; “to empower parents to restrict their children’s
access to objectionable or inappropriate online content”; and
“to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive
computer services.”  See id. § 230(b)(2)–(4).
This court has decided one prior case where we
considered the scope of § 230, but were principally concerned
with which types of online-service providers Congress
intended to immunize.  See Zango, 568 F.3d at 1175.  We
acknowledged that providers of computer security software
can benefit from § 230 immunity, and that such providers
have discretion to identify what online content is considered
“objectionable,” id., but we had no reason to discuss the
scope of that discretion.  The separate concurrence in Zango
focused on the future need for considering appropriate
limitations on provider control.  See id. at 1178–80 (Fisher,
J. concurring).  District courts have differed in their
Add. 9
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interpretations of Zango and the extent to which it
encouraged providers to block material.  What is clear to us
from the statutory language, history and case law is that the
criteria for blocking online material must be based on the
characteristics of the online material, i.e. its content, and not
on the identity of the entity that produced it.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff-appellant Enigma Software Group USA, LLC, is
a Florida company that sells computer security software
nationwide.  Malwarebytes Inc., a Delaware corporation
headquartered in California, also sells computer security
software nationwide.  Malwarebytes and Enigma are
therefore direct competitors.
Providers of computer security software help users
identify and block malicious or threatening software, termed
malware, from their computers.  Each provider generates its
own criteria to determine what software might threaten users. 
Defendant Malwarebytes programs its software to search for
what it calls Potentially Unwanted Programs (“PUPs”).  PUPs
include, for example, what Malwarebytes describes as
software that contains “obtrusive, misleading, or deceptive
advertisements, branding or search practices.”  Once
Malwarebytes’s security software is purchased and installed
on a user’s computer, it scans for PUPs, and according to
Enigma’s complaint, if the user tries to download a program
that Malwarebytes has determined to be a PUP, a pop-up alert
warns the user of a security risk and advises the user to stop
the download and block the potentially threatening content.
Add. 10
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Malwarebytes and Enigma have been direct competitors
since 2008, the year of Malwarebytes’s inception.  In their
first eight years as competitors, neither Enigma nor
Malwarebytes flagged the other’s software as threatening or
unwanted.  In late 2016, however, Malwarebytes revised its
PUP-detection criteria to include any program that, according
to Malwarebytes, users did not seem to like.
After the revision, Malwarebytes’s software immediately
began flagging Enigma’s most popular programs—
RegHunter and SpyHunter—as PUPs.  Thereafter, anytime a
user with Malwarebytes’s software tried to download those
Enigma programs, the user was alerted of a security risk and,
according to Enigma’s complaint, the download was
prohibited, i.e. Malwarebytes  “quarantined” the programs. 
Enigma alleges that Malwarebytes’s new definition of a PUP
includes subjective criteria that Malwarebytes has
“implemented at its own malicious whim” in order to identify
Enigma’s programs as threats.  Enigma characterizes the
revision as a “guise” for anticompetitive conduct, and alleges
that its programs are “legitimate”, “highly regarded”, and
“pose no security threat.”  As a result of Malwarebytes’s
actions, Enigma claims that it has lost customers and revenue
and experienced harm to its reputation.
Enigma brought this action against Malwarebytes in early
2017, in the Southern District of New York.  Enigma claimed
that Malwarebytes has used its PUP-modification process to
advance a “bad faith campaign of unfair competition” aimed
at “deceiving consumers and interfering with [Enigma’s]
customer relationships.”
Add. 11
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Enigma’s complaint alleged four claims, three under New
York state law and one under federal law.  The first state-law
claim accused Malwarebytes of using deceptive business
practices in violation of New York General Business Law
§ 349.  Enigma’s second and third state-law claims alleged
tortious interference with business and contractual relations
in violation of New York state common law.  The federal
claim accused Malwarebytes of making false and misleading
statements to deceive consumers into choosing
Malwarebytes’s security software over Enigma’s, in violation
of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(B).
Malwarebytes sought a change of venue.  Although
Enigma maintained that venue was proper in New York
because Malwarebytes’s conduct affected users and
computers within that state, the conduct at issue had national
reach.  The district court therefore granted Malwarebytes’s
motion to transfer the case to the Northern District of
California, where Malwarebytes is headquartered.
Malwarebytes then moved to dismiss for failure to state
a claim, arguing that it was immune from liability under
§ 230(c)(2) of the CDA.  The district court granted the
motion, finding that under the reasoning of our decision in
Zango, Malwarebytes was immune under § 230 on all of
Enigma’s claims.  The district court interpreted Zango to
mean that anti-malware software providers are free to block
users from accessing any material that those providers, in
their discretion, deem to be objectionable.  Given
Malwarebytes’s status as a provider of filtering software, and
its assertion that Enigma’s programs are potentially
unwanted, the district court held that Malwarebytes could not
be liable under state law for blocking users’ access to
Enigma’s programs.
Add. 12
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With respect to the federal claim, the district court had to
consider the intellectual property exception to the CDA’s
immunity provision set forth in 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2).  The
somewhat opaque exception states that § 230 immunity “shall
not be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to
intellectual property.”  Id.  Enigma’s federal claim alleged
false advertising under the Lanham Act, and Enigma
contended that immunity did not apply because that statute
deals with intellectual property, i.e. trademarks.  The district
court reasoned, however, that although the Lanham Act itself
deals with intellectual property, Enigma’s false advertising
claim did not relate to any type of intellectual property and
therefore § 230 immunity encompassed that claim as well. 
Having concluded that Malwarebytes was immune on all four
claims, the district court dismissed the complaint and granted
judgment for Malwarebytes.
On appeal, Enigma primarily contends that the district
court erred in interpreting our Zango opinion to give online
service providers unlimited discretion to block online content,
and that the Good Samaritan blocking provision does not
provide such sweeping immunity that it encompasses
anticompetitive conduct.
DISCUSSION
I. Scope of § 230(c)(2) Immunity as Applied to State-
Law Claims
The district court held that our opinion in Zango
controlled, and interpreted Zango to mean that an online-
service provider cannot be liable for blocking internet users
from accessing online content that the provider considers
objectionable, regardless of the provider’s motivations or the
Add. 13
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harmful effects of the blocking.  The scope of the statutory
catchall phrase, “otherwise objectionable,” was not at issue in
Zango, however.  The central issue in Zango was whether
§ 230 immunity applies to filtering software providers like
the defendant Kaspersky in that case, and both parties in this
case.  See 568 F.3d at 1173, 1176.  We held such providers
had immunity.  Id. at 1177–78.  At the end of our majority
opinion, we emphasized the relevant statutory language in
stating that § 230 permits providers to block material “that
either the provider or the user considers . . . objectionable.” 
See id. at 1177 (original emphasis).  The district court focused
on that sentence and reasoned that Malwarebytes had
unfettered discretion to select what criteria makes a program
“objectionable” under § 230, and further, that the court was
not to analyze Malwarebytes’s reasons for doing so.
The majority in Zango did not, however, address whether
there were limitations on a provider’s discretion to declare
online content “objectionable.”  No such issue was raised in
the appeal.  We noted that Zango “waived” the argument that
its software was not “objectionable.”  See id. at 1176–77.  We
therefore held that § 230 immunity covered Kaspersky’s
decision to block users from accessing the type of content at
issue in that case and concluded that § 230 permits providers
to block material that “the provider considers . . .
objectionable.”  Id. at 1177.
It was Judge Fisher’s concurring opinion in Zango that
framed the issue for future litigation as to whether the term
“objectionable” might be construed in a way that would
immunize providers even if they blocked online content for
improper reasons.  See id. at 1178–80 (Fisher, J. concurring). 
Judge Fisher warned that extending immunity beyond the
facts of that case could “pose serious problems,” particularly
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where a provider is charged with using § 230 immunity to
advance an anticompetitive agenda.  See id. at 1178.  He said
that an “unbounded” reading of the phrase “otherwise
objectionable” would allow a content provider to “block
content for anticompetitive purposes or merely at its
malicious whim.”  Id.
District courts nationwide have grappled with the issues
discussed in Zango’s majority and concurring opinions, and
have reached differing results.  Like the district court in this
case, at least two other federal district courts have relied on
Zango to dismiss software-provider lawsuits against
Malwarebytes where the plaintiff claimed that Malwarebytes
improperly characterized the plaintiff’s software as a PUP. 
See PC Drivers Headquarters, LP v. Malwarebytes Inc.,
371 F. Supp. 3d 652 (N.D. Cal. 2019); PC Drivers
Headquarters, LP v. Malwarebytes, Inc., No. 1:18-CV-234-
RP, 2018 WL 2996897, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2018).
Other district courts have viewed our holding in Zango to
be less expansive.  See Song fi Inc. v. Google, Inc., 108 F.
Supp. 3d 876, 884 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (noting that just because
“the statute requires the user or service provider to
subjectively believe the blocked or screened material is
objectionable does not mean anything or everything YouTube
finds subjectively objectionable is within the scope of Section
230(c),” and concluding that, “[o]n the contrary such an
‘unbounded’ reading . . . would enable content providers to
‘block content for anticompetitive reasons[.]’”) (quoting
Judge Fisher’s concurrence in Zango); Sherman v. Yahoo!
Inc., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1138 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (same); see
also Holomaxx Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 783 F. Supp. 2d
1097, 1104 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2011) (acknowledging that a
provider’s subjective determination of what constitutes
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objectionable material under § 230(c)(2) is not limitless, but
finding that the harassing emails in that case were reasonably
objectionable).
We find these decisions recognizing limitations in the
scope of immunity to be persuasive.  The courts interpreting
Zango as providing unlimited immunity seem to us to have
stretched our opinion in Zango too far.  This is because the
focus of that appeal was neither what type of material may be
blocked, nor why it may be blocked, but rather who benefits
from § 230 immunity.  The issue was whether § 230
immunity applies to filtering-software providers.  See Zango,
568 F.3d at 1173.  We answered that question in the
affirmative, explaining that Kaspersky was the type of
“interactive computer service” to which § 230(c)(2) expressly
referred, and that Kaspersky was engaged in the type of
conduct to which § 230(c)(2) generally applies.  Id.
at 1175–76.
As relevant here, the majority opinion in Zango
establishes only that Malwarebytes, as a filtering-software
provider, is an entity to which the immunity afforded by
§ 230 would apply.  The majority opinion does not require us
to hold that we lack the authority to question Malwarebytes’s
determinations of what content to block.  We must therefore
in this case analyze § 230 to decide what limitations, if any,
there are on the ability of a filtering software provider to
block users from receiving online programming.
The legal question before us is whether § 230(c)(2)
immunizes blocking and filtering decisions that are driven by
anticompetitive animus.  The majority in Zango had no
occasion to address the issue, and the parties in that case were
not competitors.  See 568 F. 3d at 1170 (explaining
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Kaspersky is a security software provider; Zango provides an
online service for users to stream movies, video games, and
music).  This is the first § 230 case we are aware of that
involves direct competitors.
In this appeal, Enigma alleges that Malwarebytes blocked
Enigma’s programs for anticompetitive reasons, not because
the programs’ content was objectionable within the meaning
of § 230, and that § 230 does not provide immunity for
anticompetitive conduct.  Malwarebytes’s position is that,
given the catchall, Malwarebytes has immunity regardless of
any anticompetitive motives.
We cannot accept Malwarebytes’s position, as it appears
contrary to CDA’s history and purpose.  Congress expressly
provided that the CDA aims “to preserve the vibrant and
competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet
and other interactive computer services” and to “remove
disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking
and filtering technologies.”  § 230(b)(2)–(3).  Congress said
it gave providers discretion to identify objectionable content
in large part to protect competition, not suppress it.  Id.  In
other words, Congress wanted to encourage the development
of filtration technologies, not to enable software developers
to drive each other out of business.
In the infancy of the internet, the unwillingness of
Congress to spell out the meaning of “otherwise
objectionable” was understandable.  The broad grant of
protective control over online content may have been more
readily acceptable in an era before the potential magnitude of
internet communication was fully comprehended.  Indeed, the
fears of harmful content at the time led Congress to enact, in
the same statute, an outright ban on the dissemination of
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online pornography, a ban which the Supreme Court swiftly
rejected as unconstitutional a year later.  See Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. at 877–79 (striking down 47 U.S.C. § 223).
We must today recognize that interpreting the statute to
give providers unbridled discretion to block online content
would, as Judge Fisher warned, enable and potentially
motivate internet-service providers to act for their own, and
not the public, benefit.  See 568 F.3d at 1178 (Fisher, J.,
concurring).  Immunity for filtering practices aimed at
suppressing competition, rather than protecting internet users,
would lessen user control over what information they receive,
contrary to Congress’s stated policy.  See § 230(b)(3) (to
maximize user control over what content they view).  Indeed,
users selecting a security software provider must trust that the
provider will block material consistent with that user’s
desires.  Users would not reasonably anticipate providers
blocking valuable online content in order to stifle
competition.  Immunizing anticompetitive blocking would,
therefore, be contrary to another of the statute’s express
policies: “removing disincentives for the utilization of
blocking and filtering technologies.”  Id. § 230(b)(4).
We therefore reject Malwarebytes’s position that § 230
immunity applies regardless of anticompetitive purpose.  But
we cannot, as Enigma asks us to do,  ignore the breadth of the
term “objectionable” by construing it to cover only material
that is sexual or violent in nature.  Enigma would have us
read the general, catchall phrase “otherwise objectionable” as
limited to the categories of online material described in the
seven specific categories that precede it.  See 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(c)(2) (describing material that is “obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing or otherwise
objectionable.”).  Enigma argues that its software has no such
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content, and that Malwarebytes therefore cannot claim
immunity for blocking it.
Enigma relies on the principle of ejusdem generis, which
teaches that when a generic term follows specific terms, the
generic term should be construed to reference subjects akin
to those with the specific enumeration.  See, e.g., Norfolk &
W. Ry. Co. v. Am. Train Dispatchers Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117, 129
(1991).  But the specific categories listed in § 230(c)(2) vary
greatly: Material that is lewd or lascivious is not necessarily
similar to material that is violent, or material that is harassing. 
If the enumerated categories are not similar, they provide
little or no assistance in interpreting the more general
category.  We have previously recognized this concept.  See
Sacramento Reg’l Cty. Sanitation Dist. v. Reilly, 905 F.2d
1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Where the list of objects that
precedes the ‘or other’ phrase is dissimilar, ejusdem generis
does not apply”).
We think that the catchall was more likely intended to
encapsulate forms of unwanted online content that Congress
could not identify in the 1990s.  But even if ejusdem generis
did apply, it would not support Enigma’s narrow
interpretation of “otherwise objectionable.”  Congress wanted
to give internet users tools to avoid not only violent or
sexually explicit materials, but also harassing materials. 
Spam, malware and adware could fairly be placed close
enough to harassing materials to at least be called “otherwise
objectionable” while still being faithful to the principle of
ejusdem generis.  Several district courts have, for example, 
regarded unsolicited marketing emails as “objectionable.” 
See, e.g., Holomaxx, 783 F. Supp. 2d at 1104; e360Insight,
LLC v. Comcast Corp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 605, 608–610 (N.D.
Ill. 2008); see also Smith v. Trusted Universal Standards In
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Elec. Transactions, Inc., No. CIV09-4567-RBK-KMW, 2010
WL 1799456, at *6 (D.N.J. May 4, 2010).  But we do not, in
this appeal, determine the precise relationship between the
term “otherwise objectionable” and the seven categories that
precede it.  We conclude only that if a provider’s basis for
objecting to and seeking to block materials is because those
materials benefit a competitor, the objection would not fall
within any category listed in the statute and the immunity
would not apply.
Malwarebytes’s fallback position is that, even if it would
lack immunity for anticompetitive blocking, Malwarebytes
has found Enigma’s programs “objectionable” for legitimate
reasons based on the programs’ content.  Malwarebytes
asserts that Enigma’s programs, SpyHunter and RegHunter,
use “deceptive tactics” to scare users into believing that they
have to download Enigma’s programs to prevent their
computers from being infected.  Enigma alleges, however,
that its programs “pose no security threat” and that
Malwarebytes’s justification for blocking these “legitimate”
and “highly regarded” programs was a guise for
anticompetitive animus.
The district court interpreted our holding in Zango to
foreclose this debate entirely, implicitly reasoning that if
Malwarebytes has sole discretion to select what programs are
“objectionable,” the court need not evaluate the reasons for
the designation.  Because we hold that § 230 does not provide
immunity for blocking a competitor’s program for
anticompetitive reasons, and because Enigma has specifically
alleged that the blocking here was anticompetitive, Enigma’s
claims survive the motion to dismiss.  We therefore reverse
the dismissal of Enigma’s state-law claims and we remand for
further proceedings.
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II. The Federal Claim and the CDA’s Intellectual
Property Exception
Enigma’s fourth claim is a claim for false advertising
under the Lanham Act, a statute dealing with a form of
intellectual property, i.e. trademarks.  Enigma alleges that
Malwarebytes publicly mischaracterized Enigma’s programs
SpyHunter and RegHunter as potentially unwanted or PUPs,
and it did so in order to interfere with Enigma’s customer
base and divert those customers to Malwarebytes.
Section 230(e)(2) of the CDA contains an exception to
immunity for intellectual property claims.  See 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(e)(2).  This exception, known as the intellectual
property carve out, states that § 230 immunity shall not “limit
or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.”  Id.  In
light of that exception, Enigma contends that immunity would
not bar Enigma’s Lanham Act claim, even if immunity is
available to Malwarebytes on the state law claims.  Although
Enigma’s claim does not itself involve an intellectual
property right, Enigma characterizes its federal false
advertising claim as one “pertaining to intellectual property”
within the meaning of § 230(e)(2) because the Lanham Act
deals with intellectual property.  The district court rejected
this argument, and rightly so.
This is because even though the Lanham Act is known as
the federal trademark statute, not all claims brought under the
statute involve trademarks.  The Act contains two parts, one
governing trademark infringement and another governing
false designations of origin, false descriptions, and dilution. 
Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (trademark infringement) with id.
§ 1125 (the rest).  The latter, § 1125, creates two bases of
liability, false association and false advertising.  Compare
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§ 1125(a)(1)(A) (false association) with § 1125(a)(1)(B)
(false advertising).  Thus, although “much of the Lanham Act
addresses the registration, use, and infringement of
trademarks and related marks, . . . § 1125(a) is one of the few
provisions that goes beyond trademark protection.”  Dastar
Corp. v. Twentieth Cent. Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 28–29
(2003).
In this appeal, we must decide whether the exception to
immunity contained in § 230(e)(2) applies to false advertising
claims brought under the Lanham Act.  Our court has not
addressed the issue, although we have considered the
exception as it would apply to state law claims.  See Perfect
10 v. CCBill, LLC, 488 F.3d 1102, 1118–19 (9th Cir. 2009)
(concluding that the intellectual property exception in
§ 230(e)(2) was not intended to cover intellectual property
claims brought under state law); see also Gen. Steel Domestic
Sales, L.L.C. v. Chumley, 840 F.3d 1178, 1182 (10th Cir.
2016) (declining to analyze the intellectual property
exception; explaining that because “§ 230 does not contain
the grant of immunity from suit contended for, it is
unnecessary to discuss its applicability to the Lanham Act
false advertising claims”).
We have observed before that because Congress did not
define the term “intellectual property law,” it should be
construed narrowly to advance the CDA’s express policy of
providing broad immunity.  See Perfect 10, 488 F.3d at 1119. 
One of these express policy reasons for providing immunity
was, as Congress stated in § 230(b)(2), “to preserve the
vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for
the Internet and other interactive computer services,
unfettered by Federal or State regulation.”  47 U.S.C.
§ 230(b)(2).  The intellectual property exception is a
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limitation on immunity, and the CDA’s stated congressional
purpose counsels against an expansive interpretation of the
exception that would diminish the scope of immunity.  If the
intellectual property law exception were to encompass any
claim raised under the Lanham Act—including false
advertising claims that do not directly involve intellectual
property rights—it would create a potential for new liability
that would upset, rather than “preserve” the vibrant culture of
innovation on the internet that Congress envisioned.  Id.
We therefore hold that the intellectual property exception
contained in § 230(e)(2) encompasses claims pertaining to an
established intellectual property right under federal law, like
those inherent in a patent, copyright, or trademark.  The
exception does not apply to false advertising claims brought
under § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act, unless the claim itself
involves intellectual property.
Here, Enigma’s Lanham Act claim derives from the
statute’s false advertising provision.  Enigma alleges that
Malwarebytes mischaracterized Enigma’s most popular
software programs in order to divert Enigma’s customers to
Malwarebytes.  These allegations do not relate to or involve
trademark rights or any other intellectual property rights. 
Thus, Enigma’s false advertising claim is not a claim
“pertaining to intellectual property law” within the meaning
of § 230(e)(2).  The district court correctly concluded that the
intellectual property exception to immunity does not
encompass Enigma’s Lanham Act claim.
The district court went on to hold, however, as it did with
the state law claims, that Malwarebytes is nevertheless
immune from liability under our decision in Zango.  As we
have explained with respect to the state law claims, Zango did
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not define an unlimited scope of immunity under § 230, and
immunity under that section does not extend to
anticompetitive conduct.  Because the federal claim, like the
state claims, is based on allegations of such conduct, the
federal claim survives dismissal.  We therefore reverse the
district court’s judgment in favor of Malwarebytes and
remand for further proceedings on this claim as well.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is reversed and the case
is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
RAWLINSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
In his concurring opinion in Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky
Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1179–80 (9th Cir. 2009), Judge
Fisher acknowledged that “until Congress clarifies the statute
or a future litigant makes the case for a possible limitation,”
the “broadly worded” Communications Decency Act (the
Act) afforded immunity to a distributor of Internet security
software.  Congress has not further clarified the statute and
Enigma Software has not persuasively made a case for
limitation of the statute beyond its provisions.
The majority opinion seeks to limit the statute based on
the fact that the parties are competitors.  See Majority
Opinion, p. 4.  However, nothing in the statutory provisions
or our majority opinion in Zango supports such a distinction. 
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Rather the “broad language” of the Act specifically
encompasses “any action voluntarily taken [by a provider] to
restrict access to . . . material that the provider . . . considers
to be . . . otherwise objectionable.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A)
(emphasis added).  Under the language of the Act, so long as
the provider’s action is taken to remove “otherwise
objectionable” material, the restriction of access is
immunized.  See id.  The majority’s real complaint is not that
the district court construed the statute too broadly, but that the
statute is written too broadly.  However, that defect, if it is a
defect, is one beyond our authority to correct.  See Baker
Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2169 (2015).
In particular, the majority holds that the criteria for
blocking online material may not be based on the identity of
the entity that produced it.  See Majority Opinion, p. 10. 
Unfortunately, however, that conclusion cannot be squared
with the broad language of the Act.  Under the language of
the statute, if the blocked content is “otherwise objectionable”
to the provider, the Act bestows immunity.  Zango, 568 F.3d
at 1173 (“[T]he statute plainly immunizes from suit a
provider of interactive computer services that makes available
software that filters or screens material that the user or the
provider deems objectionable.”) (emphasis in the original);
1174 (“According protection to providers of programs that
filter adware and malware is also consistent with the
Congressional goals for immunity articulated in [47 U.S.C.]
§ 230 itself.”).  Although the parties were not direct
competitors, the plaintiff in Zango asserted similar anti-
competition effects.  See id. at 1171–72.  The majority’s
policy arguments are in conflict with our recognition in
Zango that the broad language of the Act is consistent with
“the Congressional goals for immunity” as expressed in the
language of the statute.  Id. at 1174.  As the district court
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cogently noted, we “must presume that a legislature says in
a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says
there.”  Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249,
253–54 (1992) (citations omitted).
I respectfully dissent.
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Calendar Line 1 
 
Case Name:  Prager University v. Google LLC, et al.  
Case No.:  19-CV-340667 
 
This action arises from Prager University’s allegations that YouTube, LLC and its 
parent company Google LLC have unlawfully restricted content created by Prager on 
YouTube, defendants’ social media and video sharing platform.  Before the Court are 
defendants’ demurrer to the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) and Prager’s motion 
for a preliminary injunction.  Both motions are opposed. 
 
I.  Factual and Procedural Background 
 
 As alleged in the FAC, Prager is a non-profit, 501(c)(3) tax exempt, educational 
organization that promotes discussion on historical, religious, and current events by 
disseminating educational videos intended for younger, student-based audiences between the 
ages of 13 and 35.  (FAC, ¶ 10.)  The videos depict scholars, sources, and other prominent 
speakers who often espouse viewpoints in the mainstream of conservative thought.  (Ibid.)   
 
 Defendants operate YouTube as the largest and most profitable mechanism for 
monetizing free speech and freedom of expression in the history of the world, generating $10 
to 15 billion in annual revenue by monetizing the content of users like Prager who are invited 
to post videos to YouTube.  (FAC, ¶ 11.)  Since its inception, Prager has posted more than 250 
of its videos to YouTube.  (Id. at ¶ 39.) 
 
 A.  The Alleged Content Restriction Scheme 
 
 To induce users like Prager to upload video content, defendants represent that YouTube 
is a public place for free speech defined by “four essential freedoms” that govern the public’s 
use of the platform: 
 
1. Freedom of Expression:  We believe people should be able to speak freely, share 
opinions, foster open dialogue, and that creative freedom leads to new voices, formats 
and possibilities. 
 
2. Freedom of Information:  We believe everyone should have easy, open access to 
information and that video is a powerful force for education, building understanding, 
and documenting world events, big and small. 
 
3. Freedom of Opportunity:  We believe everyone should have a chance to be 
discovered, build a business and succeed on their own terms, and that people—not 
gatekeepers—decide what’s popular. 
 
4. Freedom to Belong:  We believe everyone should be able to find communities of 
support, break down barriers, transcend borders and come together around shared 
interests and passions. 
 
Add. 29
Case: 17-17351, 10/28/2019, ID: 11480086, DktEntry: 56, Page 56 of 71
 
        2 
(FAC, ¶ 12.)  Defendants further promise that YouTube is governed by content-based rules and 
filtering which “apply equally to all,” regardless of the viewpoint, identity, or source of the 
speaker.  (Id. at ¶ 13.)   
 
 However, contrary to these representations, defendants censor, restrict, and restrain 
video content based on animus, discrimination, profit, and/or for any other reason “or no 
reason.”  (FAC, ¶ 14.)  According to Prager, an internal memo and presentation entitled “The 
Good Censor” shows that defendants have secretly decided to “ ‘migrate’ away from [serving 
as] a hosting platform …where the public is invited to engage in freedom of expression” to 
become a media company that profits “by promoting Defendants’ own, or their preferred 
content through the exercise of unfettered discretion to censor and curate otherwise public 
content.”  (Id. at ¶¶ 56-65.)  To effectuate their discriminatory practices, defendants use 
clandestine filtering tools, including algorithms and other machine-based and manual review 
tools, that are embedded with discriminatory and anti-competitive animus-based code, 
including code that is used to identify and restrict content based on the identity, viewpoint, or 
topic of the speaker.  (Id., ¶ 19.)  They also “ensure that the YouTube employees charged with 
administering the content filtering and regulation scheme … operate in a dysfunctional and 
politically partisan workplace environment.”  (Id. at ¶ 20.)   
 
 Against this background, Prager’s rights under California law have been violated by 
two unlawful content-based restrictions: (i) “Restricted Mode,” a filtering protocol that 
defendants use to block what they deem, in their sole, unfettered discretion, to be 
“inappropriate” for “sensitive” audiences and (ii) “Advertising Restrictions,” a content-based 
video advertising restriction policy that prohibits potential advertisers from accessing videos 
that defendants deem “inappropriate” for advertising.  (FAC, ¶ 17.)  Defendants use these 
mechanisms as a pretext to restrict and censor Prager’s videos, even though the content of its 
videos complies with YouTube’s Terms of Service, Community Guidelines, and criteria for 
“sensitive audiences” and advertisers, while they fail to restrict the content of other preferred 
users, content partners, and content produced by defendants themselves that is not compliant.  
(Id. at ¶¶ 18, 23.)  Defendants have provided no rational basis for restricting Prager’s content 
while allowing similar or noncompliant content to go unrestricted.  (Id. at ¶ 25.)   
 
 B.  Restricted Mode 
 
 According to defendants, Restricted Mode is intended “to help institutions like schools 
as well as people who wanted to better control the content they see on YouTube with an option 
to choose an intentionally limited YouTube experience.”  (FAC, ¶ 68.)  Viewers can choose to 
turn Restricted Mode on from their personal accounts, but it may also be turned on by system 
administrators for libraries, schools, and other institutions or workplaces.  (Ibid.)  Defendants 
estimate that about 1.5 percent of YouTube’s daily views (or approximately 75 million views 
per day) come from individuals using Restricted Mode.  (Id. at ¶ 69.)  When Restricted Mode 
is activated, a video’s name, creator or subject, and content, along with any other information 
related to the video, are blocked, as if the video did not exist on the YouTube platform.  (Id. at 
¶ 68.) 
 
 Defendants claim to restrict content in Restricted Mode based upon their “Restricted 
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1. Talking about drug use or abuse, or drinking alcohol in videos; 
2. Overly detailed conversations about or depictions of sex or sexual activity; 
3. Graphic descriptions of violence, violent acts, natural disasters and tragedies, or even 
violence in the news; 
4. Videos that cover specific details about events related to terrorism, war, crime, and 
political conflicts that resulted in death or serious injury, even if no graphic imagery is 
shown; 
5. Inappropriate language, including profanity; and 
6. Video content that is gratuitously incendiary, inflammatory, or demeaning towards an 
individual or group. 
 
(FAC, ¶ 70.)  Videos are initially restricted through an automated filtering algorithm that 
examines certain “signals” like the video’s metadata, title, and language, or following manual 
review if a video is “flagged” as inappropriate by public viewers.  (Id., ¶ 71.) 
 
 YouTube also publishes “Community Guidelines” and “Age Based Restriction” 
guidelines similar to its “Restricted Mode Guidelines”; however, content that complies with 
these guidelines may nevertheless be subject to Restricted Mode.  (FAC, ¶¶ 72-73.)  Prager’s 
videos have never been age restricted or found to violate YouTube’s Community Guidelines.  
(Id. at ¶ 75.) 
 
 Defendants have admitted that they make “mistakes in understanding context and 
nuances when [assessing] which videos to make available in Restricted Mode.”  (FAC, ¶ 91.)  
For example, on March 19, 2017, they publicly admitted that they improperly restricted videos 
posted or produced by members of the LGBTQ community and changed their policy, filtering 
algorithm, and manual review policies in response to complaints from this community.  (Id. at 
¶¶ 94-96.)  However, Prager alleges that defendants have continued to improperly restrict 
videos by LGBTQ users, which is evidence of viewpoint animus.  (Id. at ¶¶ 97-98.) 
 
 C.  Advertising Restrictions 
 
 Defendants also restrict users like Prager “from monetizing or boosting the reach or 
viewer distribution of [their] videos.”  (FAC, ¶ 78.)  Prager alleges that these restrictions are 
ostensibly governed by the “AdSense program policies,” which it suggests are “similar[ly] 
vague, ambiguous, and arbitrary” to the Restricted Mode Guidelines.  (Id. at ¶¶ 78, 80.)  Prager 
claims that, similar to their “mistakes” in applying “Restricted Mode,” defendants once 
“denied a reach boost or ad product” on the ground of “shocking content” based on a user’s 
sexual or gender orientation and viewpoint.  (Id. at ¶ 81.)  It alleges that the application of such 
an “inappropriate” or “shocking content” designation falsely and unfairly stigmatizes Prager as 
well.  (Id. at ¶ 82.)  (However, while Prager alleges that certain of its videos have been 
demonetized, it does not allege whether defendants gave specific reasons for these actions or 
what those reasons were.)  (See id. at ¶ 84.) 
 
 D.  The Parties’ Dispute 
 
 In July of 2016, Prager discovered that defendants were restricting user access to its 
videos through Restricted Mode.  (FAC, ¶ 101.)  It raised the issue with defendants, but they 
have failed to offer any reasonable or consistent explanation for why Prager’s videos are being 
restricted.  (Id. at ¶¶ 101-117.)  In 2016, at least 16 Prager videos were restricted; by 2017, a 
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total of 21 were.  (Ibid.)  By the time the FAC was filed in May of 2019, the total had risen to 
80.  (Id. at ¶ 127.)  Prager’s videos were either “restricted as to content, demonetized, or both.”  
(Id. at ¶ 116.)  Defendants also discontinued Prager’s “ad grants” account for more than six 
days in October of 2017.  (Id. at ¶ 118.)  On pages 9-17 of the FAC, Prager provides a chart 
listing its restricted videos by title, along with videos from defendants’ “preferred content 
providers” with similar titles that are unrestricted.  (Id. at ¶ 23.)   
 
 On October 23, 2017, Prager sued defendants in federal court, asserting claims for (1) 
violation of Article I, section 2 of the California Constitution; (2) violation of the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution; (3) violation of the California Unruh Civil 
Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), Cal. Civ. Code. § 51 et seq.; (4) violation of California’s Unfair 
Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.; (5) breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (6) violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 et 
seq.; and (7) declaratory relief.  (Prager University v. Google LLC (N.D. Cal., Mar. 26, 2018, 
No. 17-CV-06064-LHK) 2018 WL 1471939, at *2.)  It filed a motion for a preliminary 
injunction in the federal action on December 29, 2017.  (Id. at *3.)  On March 26, 2018, the 
federal court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss Prager’s federal claims and denied 
Prager’s motion for a preliminary injunction, finding that Prager had failed to state a claim for 
violation of the First Amendment because it did not allege state action, and had also failed to 
state a claim under the Lanham Act.  (Id. at *5-13.)  Having dismissed all of Prager’s federal 
claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over its state law claims, 
explaining: 
 
Here, the factors of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity support 
dismissal of Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims. This case is still at the 
pleading stage, and no discovery has taken place. Federal judicial resources are 
conserved by dismissing the state law theories of relief at this stage. Further, the 
Court finds that dismissal promotes comity as it enables California courts to 
interpret questions of state law. This is an especially important consideration in 
the instant case because Plaintiff asserts a claim that demands an analysis of the 
reach of Article I, section 2 of the California Constitution in the age of social 
media and the Internet. 
 
(Prager University v. Google LLC, supra, 2018 WL 1471939, at *13.)  Prager has appealed the 
federal court’s ruling to the Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit, which heard argument in the 
matter on August 27, 2019. 
 
 Prager filed this action on January 8, 2019, reasserting its state law claims for 
(1) violation of Article I, section 2 of the California Constitution; (2) violation of the Unruh 
Act; (3) violation of the UCL; and (4) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.  On May 13, the Court entered a stipulated order establishing a briefing schedule for 
Prager’s anticipated motion for a preliminary injunction and defendants’ anticipated demurrer 
and/or special motion to strike.  On May 20, pursuant to that order, Prager moved for a 
preliminary injunction and filed the FAC, which asserts the same four causes of action as its 
original complaint.  Defendants filed their demurrer on June 28.  Both matters are now fully 
briefed and have come on for hearing by the Court. 
 
II.  Demurrer to the FAC 
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 Defendants demur to each cause of action in the FAC for failure to state a claim.  (Code 
Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e).)  They contend that Prager’s claims are barred by two 
provisions of section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (the “CDA”) and by the First 
Amendment, and otherwise fail to state a cause of action.   
 
 Defendants’ request for judicial notice, which is unopposed, is GRANTED as to public 
web pages displaying the terms of the various YouTube policies at issue in this action (Exhibits 
1-9).  (Evid. Code § 452, subd. (h); see Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. State of Cal. (1970) 3 
Cal.3d 573, 575, fn.1 [where portions of agreement were attached to plaintiff’s complaint, the 
balance of that agreement was properly a subject of judicial notice]; Ingram v. Flippo (1999) 
74 Cal.App.4th 1280, 1285 [judicial notice of letter and media release was proper where, 
although they were not attached to the complaint, they formed a basis for the claims, and the 
complaint excerpted quotes and summarized parts in detail, thus “it is essential that we 
evaluate the complaint by reference to these documents”].)  Defendants’ request is also 
GRANTED as to a transcript of a case management conference held in the federal action, 
although the Court is not bound by the court’s comments or rulings in that case.  (Evid. Code § 
452, subd. (d).) 
 
 A.  Legal Standard 
 
  The function of a demurrer is to test the legal sufficiency of a pleading.  (Trs. Of 
Capital Wholesale Elec. Etc. Fund v. Shearson Lehman Bros. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 617, 
621.)  Consequently, “[a] demurrer reaches only to the contents of the pleading and such 
matters as may be considered under the doctrine of judicial notice.”  (South Shore Land Co. v. 
Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 732, internal citations and quotations omitted; see also 
Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).)  “It is not the ordinary function of a demurrer to test the 
truth of the plaintiff’s allegations or the accuracy with which he describes the defendant’s 
conduct. … Thus, … the facts alleged in the pleading are deemed to be true, however 
improbable they may be.”  (Align Technology, Inc. v. Tran (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 949, 958, 
internal citations and quotations omitted.)           
  
 In ruling on a demurrer, the allegations of the complaint must be liberally construed, 
with a view to substantial justice between the parties.  (Glennen v. Allergan, Inc. (2016) 247 
Cal.App.4th 1, 6.)  Nevertheless, while “[a] demurrer admits all facts properly pleaded, [it 
does] not [admit] contentions, deductions or conclusions of law or fact.”  (George v. 
Automobile Club of Southern California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1120.)  A demurrer will 
lie where the allegations and matters subject to judicial notice clearly disclose some defense or 
bar to recovery, including a statutory immunity.  (Casterson v. Superior Court 
(Cardoso) (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 177, 183.)    
 
 B.  Violation of the California Constitution 
 
 Because concepts related to the parties’ speech rights under the First Amendment and 
California Constitution are important to other aspects of its analysis, the Court will first 
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 As urged by defendants, “California’s free speech clause”—like the First 
Amendment—“contains a state action limitation.”  (Golden Gateway Center v. Golden 
Gateway Tenants Assn. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1013, 1023.)  However, the California Constitution’s 
protection of speech has been interpreted more broadly in this regard.  (See Fashion Valley 
Mall, LLC v. National Labor Relations Bd. (2007) 42 Cal.4th 850, 862-863.)  Most notably, in 
the “groundbreaking” decision of Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center (1979) 23 Cal.3d 899, 
the Supreme Court of California “departed from the First Amendment jurisprudence of the 
United States Supreme Court and extended the reach of the free speech clause of the California 
Constitution to privately owned shopping centers.”  (Golden Gateway Center v. Golden 
Gateway Tenants Assn., supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1016.) 
 
 More than 20 years after Robins v. Pruneyard, Golden Gateway Center confirmed and 
began to define the scope of the state action limitation under the California Constitution, 
finding the requirement was not satisfied where a tenants’ association sought to distribute 
leaflets in a private apartment complex that was “not freely open to the public.”  (Golden 
Gateway Center v. Golden Gateway Tenants Assn., supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1031.)  Golden 
Gateway Center looked to the reasoning of Robins for guidance, noting that “Robins relied 
heavily on the functional equivalence of the shopping center to a traditional public forum-the 
downtown or central business district,” and relied on “the public character of the property,” 
emphasizing “the public’s unrestricted access.”  (Id. at pp. 1032-1033, internal citations and 
quotations omitted.)  Golden Gateway Center held that this unrestricted access is a “threshold 
requirement for establishing state action”: without it, private property “is not the functional 
equivalent of a traditional public forum.”  (Id. at p. 1033.)  In announcing this requirement, the 
opinion confirmed that it “largely follow[ed] the Court of Appeal decisions 
construing Robins,” including Planned Parenthood v. Wilson (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1662.  
(Id. at p. 1033.)  Those decisions also emphasized Robins’s focus on “the unique character of 
the modern shopping center and … the public role such centers have assumed in contemporary 
society” by effectively replacing “the traditional town center business block, where historically 
the public’s First Amendment activity was exercised and its right to do so scrupulously 
guarded.”  (Planned Parenthood v. Wilson, supra, 234 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1669-1670.)  This 
concept was again emphasized by the California Supreme Court in Fashion Valley, which 
repeatedly referenced “[t]he idea that private property can constitute a public forum for free 
speech if it is open to the public in a manner similar to that of public streets and sidewalks ….”  
(Fashion Valley Mall, LLC v. National Labor Relations Bd., supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 858; see 
also id. at p. 859.) 
 
 With this fundamental principle in mind, it is apparent that Prager does not state a claim 
under the California Constitution.  Prager contends that “YouTube is the cyber equivalent of a 
town square where citizens exchange ideas on matters of public interest” and that defendants 
have opened their platform to the public by advertising its use for this purpose.  However, 
Prager does not allege that it has been denied access to the core YouTube service.  Rather, it 
urges that its access to “Restricted Mode” and YouTube’s advertising service has been 
restricted.  Prager does not persuade the Court that these services are freely open to the public 
or are the functional equivalent of a traditional public forum like a town square or a central 
business district.1  Considering “the nature, purpose, and primary use of the property; the 
                                                 
1 Prager cites no authority that supports its position that a court can never determine the applicability of Robins on 
demurrer, and this position is incorrect.  (See Savage v. Trammell Crow Co. (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 1562, 1577, 
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extent and nature of the public invitation to use the property; and the relationship between the 
ideas sought to be presented and the purpose of the property’s occupants” (Albertson’s, Inc. v. 
Young (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 119), it is clear that these services are nothing like a 
traditional public forum.  “Restricted Mode” is an optional service that enables users to limit 
the content that they (or their children, patrons, or employees) view in order to avoid mature 
content.  Limiting content is the very purpose of this service, and defendants do not give 
content creators unrestricted access to it or suggest that they will do so.  The service exists to 
permit users to avoid the more open experience of the core YouTube service.  Similarly, the 
use of YouTube’s advertising service is restricted to meet the preferences of advertisers.  (See 
FAC, ¶ 80 [stated purpose of advertising restrictions “is to keep Google’s content and search 
networks safe and clean for our advertisers …”]; Declaration of Brian M. Willen, Exs. 7-9.) 
 
 Defendants correctly urge that even to recognize the core YouTube platform as a public 
forum would be a dramatic expansion of Robins.  As one federal court observed, “[t]he analogy 
between a shopping mall and the Internet is imperfect, and there are a host of potential 
‘slippery slope’ problems that are likely to surface were [Robins] to apply to the Internet.”  
(hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corporation (N.D. Cal. 2017) 273 F.Supp.3d 1099, 1116 
[observing that “[n]o court has expressly extended [Robins] to the Internet generally”], aff’d 
and remanded (9th Cir. 2019) 938 F.3d 985.)  However the courts of this state ultimately view 
that analogy with regard to a dominant, widely-used site like the core YouTube service, the 
analogy falls apart completely on the facts alleged here.  “Restricted Mode” and YouTube’s 
advertising service are new, inherently selective platforms that do not resemble a traditional 
public forum.  As discussed below, even more than the core YouTube service, these platforms 
necessarily reflect the exercise of editorial discretion rather than serving as an open “town 
square.” 
 
 Finally, Prager contends that cases that have deemed web sites to be “public forums” 
for purposes of California’s “anti-SLAPP” statute require this Court to extend Robins to its 
claim.  However, the anti-SLAPP statute encompasses speech “in a place open to the public or 
a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest” (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd. 
(e)(3), emphasis added), and has been applied to locations that clearly do not meet the standard 
described in Golden Gateway Center.  (See, e.g., Seelig v. Infinity Broadcasting Corp. (2002) 
97 Cal.App.4th 798, 807 [anti-SLAPP statute applied to comments made during on-air 
discussion on talk radio].)  “[T]he protections afforded by the anti-SLAPP statute are 
not coextensive with the categories of conduct or speech protected by the First Amendment or 
its California counterparts (Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 2–4).”  (Industrial Waste & Debris Box 
Service, Inc. v. Murphy (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 1135, 1152.)  “As our high court recently 
reaffirmed, ‘courts determining whether conduct is protected under the anti-SLAPP statute 
look not to First Amendment law, but to the statutory definitions in section 425.16, subdivision 
(e).’ ”  (Ibid., quoting City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 422.) 
 
 Defendants’ demurrer to the first cause of action will accordingly be sustained without 
leave to amend.  In addition to failing to state a claim under Robins v. Pruneyard, this cause of 
action is barred by section 230 of the CDA for the reasons discussed below.  (See In re 
Garcia (2014) 58 Cal.4th 440, 452 [supremacy clause of the federal Constitution requires that 
any conflicting state law give way to federal statute], citing U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2 [“This 
                                                                                                                                                          
fn. 4 [stating that scope of Robins can be addressed on demurrer in appropriate circumstances].)  Here, the 
necessary facts are alleged in the FAC and/or subject to judicial notice. 
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Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof ... 
shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any 
thing in the Constitution or laws of any state to the contrary notwithstanding”].)  
 
 B.  CDA Immunity 
 
 Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA provides that “[n]o provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by 
another information content provider.”  “§ 230 precludes courts from entertaining claims that 
would place a computer service provider in a publisher’s role.  Thus, lawsuits seeking to hold a 
service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as 
deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred.”  (Hassell v. 
Bird (2018) 5 Cal.5th 522, 536, quoting Zeran v. America Online, Inc. (4th Cir. 1997) 129 F.3d 
327, 330.) 
 
 “The CDA—of which section 230 is a part—was enacted in 1996.”  (Delfino v. Agilent 
Technologies, Inc. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 790, 802.)  “Its ‘primary goal ... was to control the 
exposure of minors to indecent material’ over the Internet.”  (Ibid., quoting Batzel v. Smith (9th 
Cir. 2003) 333 F.3d 1018, 1026, superseded by statute on another point as stated in Breazeale 
v. Victim Services, Inc. (9th Cir. 2017) 878 F.3d 759, 766.)  “Thus, an ‘important purpose of 
[the CDA] was to encourage [Internet] service providers to self-regulate the dissemination of 
offensive materials over their services.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Zeran v. America Online, Inc., supra,  
129 F.3d at p. 331.)  Section 230(c)(2) consequently immunizes service providers2  who 
endeavor to restrict access to material deemed objectionable, providing that 
 
[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on 
account of-- 
 
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability 
of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, 
filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not 
such material is constitutionally protected; or 
 
(B) any action taken to enable or make available to information content 
providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described in 
paragraph (1).3 
 
(47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2).) 
 
 A second, but related, objective of the CDA “was to avoid the chilling effect upon 
Internet free speech that would be occasioned by the imposition of tort liability upon 
companies that do not create potentially harmful messages but are simply intermediaries for 
their delivery.”  (Delfino v. Agilent Technologies, Inc., supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at pp. 802-803.)  
                                                 
2 There is no dispute that defendants are providers of “an interactive computer service” under section 230. 
 
3 It is widely agreed that section 230(c)(2)(B)’s reference to “paragraph (1)” is an error, and the provision should 
be interpreted to refer to section 230(c)(2)(A) or “paragraph (A).”  (See, e.g., Enigma Software Group USA, LLC 
v. Malwarebytes, Inc. (9th Cir. 2019) 938 F.3d 1026, 1031, fn. 1.) 
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The legislative history reflects that Congress was responding to a New York trial court case 
where “a service provider was held liable for defamatory comments posted on one of its 
bulletin boards, based on a finding that the provider had adopted the role of ‘publisher’ by 
actively screening and editing postings.”  (Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33, 44.)  “ 
‘Fearing that the specter of liability would ... deter service providers from blocking and 
screening offensive material,’ ” Congress forbid “ ‘the imposition of publisher liability on a 
service provider for the exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory functions.’ ” (Id., quoting 
Zeran v. America Online, Inc., supra, 129 F.3d at p. 331.)    Thus, section 230(c)(1) “ 
‘confer[s] broad immunity on Internet intermediaries’ ” in “ ‘a strong demonstration of 
legislative commitment to the value of maintaining a free market for online expression.’ ”  
(Hassell v. Bird, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 539, quoting Barrett v. Rosenthal, supra, 40 Cal.4th at 
p. 56.) 
 
 Of the two provisions, section 230(c)(1) has been applied more frequently and broadly, 
including by courts in the Northern District of California to conduct indistinguishable from that 
alleged in this action.  Notably, in Sikhs for Justice “SFJ”, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 
2015) 144 F.Supp.3d 1088, 1090, aff’d sub nom. Sikhs for Justice, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc. (9th 
Cir. 2017) 697 Fed.App’x. 526, a human rights organization alleged that Facebook blocked 
access to its page in India “on its own or on the behest of the Government of India,” because of 
discrimination on the grounds of race, religion, ancestry, and national origin.  Quoting Barnes 
v. Yahoo!, Inc. (9th Cir. 2009) 570 F.3d 1096 and Fair Housing Council of San Fernando 
Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC (9th Cir. 2008) 521 F.3d 1157, the court reasoned that 
 
[p]ublication involves reviewing, editing, and deciding whether to publish or to 
withdraw from publication third-party content.  Thus, a publisher decides 
whether to publish material submitted for publication.  It is immaterial whether 
this decision comes in the form of deciding what to publish in the first place or 
what to remove among the published material.  In other words, any activity that 
can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties 
seek to post online is perforce immune under section 230. 
 
(Sikhs for Justice “SFJ”, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., supra, 144 F.Supp.3d at p. 1094, emphasis 
added, internal citations and quotations omitted.)  This approach has been endorsed by the 
Ninth Circuit.  (See Riggs v. MySpace, Inc. (9th Cir. 2011) 444 Fed.App’x. 986, 987 [district 
court properly dismissed claims “arising from MySpace’s decisions to delete Riggs’s user 
profiles on its social networking website yet not delete other profiles Riggs alleged were 
created by celebrity imposters,” citing Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.Com, LLC, supra, 521 F.3d at pp. 1170-1171 for the proposition that “any activity 
that can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post 
online is perforce immune under section 230”].)  California opinions have similarly reasoned 
that the “type of activity” at issue here—“to restrict or make available certain material”—“is 
expressly covered by section 230.”  (Doe II v. MySpace Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 561, 572-
573 [describing “the general consensus to interpret section 230 immunity broadly, extending 
from Zeran …”]; see also Hassell v. Bird, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 537 [California “courts have 
followed Zeran in adopting a broad view of section 230’s immunity provisions”].)  This 
interpretation was recently applied again by the Northern District in Federal Agency of News 
LLC v. Facebook, Inc. (N.D. Cal., July 20, 2019, No. 18-CV-07041-LHK) --- F.Sup.3d ---, 
2019 WL 3254208, where it was held that section 230(c)(1) immunized Facebook from claims 
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arising from its removal of a Russian company’s account and page due to its alleged control by 
an entity found to have interfered in the 2016 United States presidential election.4    
 
 Consistent with the language of section 230(c)(1), these cases do not question the 
service provider’s motive in deciding to remove content from its service.  While Prager 
contends that section 230(c)(1) immunity should not be applied where a plaintiff alleges a 
service provider acted in bad faith or to stifle competition, it cites no persuasive authority 
adopting this interpretation.5   
 
 Courts have expressed greater concern with the issue of motive when interpreting 
section 230(c)(2), perhaps because paragraph (A) of that provision expressly includes a “good 
faith” requirement.  Here, defendants rely on paragraph (B) of that provision, which they 
urge—like section 230(c)(1)—does not require good faith.  In Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, 
Inc. (9th Cir. 2009) 568 F.3d 1169, 1176-1177, the Ninth Circuit applied section 230(c)(2)(B) 
to a provider of Internet security software that deemed the plaintiff’s software to be “malware,” 
noting that the plaintiff had waived the issue of “whether subparagraph (B), which has no good 
faith language, should be construed implicitly to have a good faith component like 
                                                 
4 See also Langdon v. Google, Inc. (D. Del. 2007) 474 F.Supp.2d 622, 630-631 (applying immunity under section 
230(c)(1) and/or (2) where plaintiff alleged defendants refused to display ads on his web pages criticizing the 
North Carolina and Chinese governments based on political viewpoint discrimination); Levitt v. Yelp! Inc. (N.D. 
Cal., Oct. 26, 2011, No. C-10-1321 EMC) 2011 WL 5079526, at *7-9, aff’d (9th Cir. 2014) 765 F.3d 1123 
(section 230(c)(1) immunity applied to allegations that Yelp manipulated plaintiffs’ user reviews in order to 
induce them to pay for advertising); Lancaster v. Alphabet Inc. (N.D. Cal., July 8, 2016, No. 15-CV-05299-HSG) 
2016 WL 3648608, at *2-3 (“§ 230[(c)(1) of the CDA prohibits any claim arising from Defendants’ removal of 
Plaintiffs’ videos”); Green v. YouTube, LLC (D.N.H., Mar. 13, 2019, No. 18-CV-203-PB) 2019 WL 1428890, at 
*6, report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Green v. YouTube, Inc. (D.N.H., Mar. 29, 2019, No. 18-CV-
203-PB) 2019 WL 1428311 (applying immunity under section 230(c)(1) where plaintiff alleged his accounts were 
improperly shut down); Brittain v. Twitter, Inc. (N.D. Cal., June 10, 2019, No. 19-CV-00114-YGR) 2019 WL 
2423375, at *3 (section 230(c)(1) immunity applied where plaintiff alleged improper suspension of his Twitter 
accounts and that Twitter “limit[ed] users who reference new/competing networks and/or utilize Third Party API 
services”); King v. Facebook, Inc. (N.D. Cal., Sept. 5, 2019, No. 19-CV-01987-WHO) 2019 WL 4221768 (section 
230(c)(1) immunity applied to theory that “Facebook has violated its (Terms of Service] in removing [plaintiff’s] 
posts and suspending his account, and that Facebook treats black activists and their posts differently than it does 
other groups, particularly white supremacists and certain ‘hate groups’ ”). 
 
5 To the extent e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc. (M.D. Fla. 2016) 188 F.Supp.3d 1265 adopts Prager’s 
view, it does so by conflating section 230(c)(1) and section 230(c)(2) with no analysis.  The Court does not find 
this persuasive.  While a subsequent, unpublished opinion in that action, e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, 
Inc. (M.D. Fla., Feb. 8, 2017, No. 214CV646FTMPAMCM) 2017 WL 2210029, *3-4 reasoned that applying  
section 230(c)(1) to service providers’ editorial decisions regarding a plaintiff’s own content would swallow “the 
more specific immunity in (c)(2)” with its good faith requirement, the opinion went on to grant summary 
judgment based on the First Amendment’s protection of editorial judgments, “no matter the motive.”  This case 
does not persuade the Court to part ways with the courts that apply section 230(c)(1) to the same end based on the 
same reasoning. 
 
Similarly, Levitt v. Yelp! Inc. (N.D. Cal., Mar. 22, 2011, No. C 10-1321 MHP) 2011 WL 13153230, at *9 deemed 
it “a[] close[] question … whether Yelp may be held liable for its removal of positive reviews for the alleged 
purpose of coercing businesses to purchase advertising,” considering that this theory implicated bad faith.  The 
court ultimately did not resolve the issue as it found the complaint otherwise failed to state a cause of action.  A 
subsequent opinion in that case, Levitt v. Yelp! Inc. (N.D. Cal., Oct. 26, 2011, No. C-10-1321 EMC) 2011 WL 
5079526, *9 held that section 230(c)(1) does not include a good faith requirement, and applied “even assuming 
Plaintiffs have adequately pled allegations stating a claim of an extortionate threat with respect to Yelp’s alleged 
manipulation of user reviews.”  The Court finds the reasoning of the subsequent opinion more persuasive. 
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subparagraph (A).”  The concurring opinion expressed concern with extending immunity 
beyond the facts present in that case: 
 
Congress plainly intended to give computer users the tools to filter the Internet’s 
deluge of material users would find objectionable, in part by immunizing the 
providers of blocking software from liability.  See § 230(b)(3). But under the 
generous coverage of § 230(c)(2)(B)’s immunity language, a blocking software 
provider might abuse that immunity to block content for anticompetitive 
purposes or merely at its malicious whim, under the cover of considering such 
material “otherwise objectionable.”  
 
(Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., supra, 568 F.3d at p. 1178 (conc. opn. of Fisher, J.).)  
Noting that “[d]istrict courts nationwide have grappled with the issues discussed in Zango’s 
majority and concurring opinions, and have reached differing results,” the Ninth Circuit 
recently held that a service provider’s intent may be relevant under section 230(c)(2)(B): 
specifically, where a plaintiff alleges blocking by a direct competitor for anticompetitive 
purposes, its claims survive dismissal.  (Enigma Software Group USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes, 
Inc. (9th Cir. 2019) 938 F.3d 1026.) 
 
 Here, defendants’ creation of a “Restricted Mode” to allow sensitive users to 
voluntarily choose a more limited experience of the YouTube service is exactly the type of 
self-regulation that Congress sought to encourage in enacting section 230, and fits within 
section 230(c)(2)(B)’s immunity for “any action taken to enable or make available to … 
others,” namely, YouTube users, “the technical means to restrict access to” material “that the 
provider or user considers to be obscene, … excessively violent, … or otherwise 
objectionable.”  Rather than unilaterally restricting access to material on its core platform as 
contemplated by section 230(c)(2)(A)—which contains a “good faith” requirement—
defendants allow users to voluntarily restrict access to material that defendants deem 
objectionable for the stated reason that, like the categories of material enumerated by the 
statute, it may be inappropriate for young or sensitive viewers.6  The Court views this as a 
critical difference between the two provisions and disagrees with the majority in Enigma,7 who 
ignore the plain language of the statute by reading a good faith limitation into section 
230(c)(2)(B).  (See Enigma Software Group USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes, Inc., supra, 938 F.3d 
at p. 1040 (dis. opn. of Rawlinson, J.) [“The majority’s policy arguments are in conflict with 
our recognition in Zango that the broad language of the Act is consistent with ‘the 
Congressional goals for immunity’ as expressed in the language of the statute.  [Citation.]  As 
the district court cogently noted, we ‘must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it 
means and means in a statute what it says there.’ ”].) 
 
                                                 
6 Consistent with these circumstances, a page discussing options for administrators employing “Restricted Mode,” 
which was submitted by Prager in connection with its motion for preliminary injunction, indicates that 
“[a]dministrators and designated approvers can now whitelist entire channels,” in addition to individual videos, to 
ensure a channel is “watchable by your users.”  (Declaration of Peter Obstler, Ex. L.)  Thus, it appears that users 
can specifically override defendants’ decisions to disable certain videos or channels in “Restricted Mode,” 
confirming that “Restricted Mode” is a tool made available to users rather than a unilateral ban. 
 
7 See People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 190 (“Decisions of lower federal courts interpreting federal law 
are not binding on state courts.”); Elliott v. Albright (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 1028, 1034 (although at times entitled 
to great weight, the decisions of the lower federal courts on federal questions are merely persuasive). 
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 Finding CDA immunity here is also consistent with cases that apply it in 
indistinguishable circumstances based on section 230(c)(1), and with their reasoning, which 
recognizes that challenges to a service provider’s editorial discretion “treat[]” the provider “as 
a publisher.”  (See Sikhs for Justice “SFJ”, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., supra, 144 F.Supp.3d 1088 
[applying section 230(c)(1) to claim under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964]; Federal 
Agency of News LLC v. Facebook, Inc., supra, 2019 WL 3254208 [applying section 230(c)(1) 
to claims under Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Unruh Act, and for breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing].)  The Court finds that immunity under section 
230(c)(1) also applies here, to the allegations involving both “Restricted Mode” and 
defendants’ advertising service. 
 
 While the Court understands Prager’s argument that all three provisions of section 230 
should have a good faith requirement, this argument is contrary to the plain language of the 
statute.  (See Hassell v. Bird, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 540 [noting that Barrett v. Rosenthal, 
supra, 40 Cal.4th 33 voiced “qualms” that Zeran’s interpretation of section 230 provides 
blanket immunity for those who intentionally redistribute defamatory statements, but held 
“these concerns were of no legal consequence” where principles of statutory interpretation 
compelled a broad construction].)  And while it is not this Court’s role to judge the wisdom of 
the policy embodied by section 230, there are good reasons to support it.  As the court in Levitt 
v. Yelp! Inc. (N.D. Cal., Oct. 26, 2011, No. C-10-1321 EMC) 2011 WL 5079526 reasoned,  
 
traditional editorial functions often include subjective judgments informed by 
political and financial considerations.  [Citation.]  Determining what motives 
are permissible and what are not could prove problematic. Indeed, from a policy 
perspective, permitting litigation and scrutin[izing] motive could result in the 
“death by ten thousand duck-bites” against which the Ninth Circuit cautioned in 
interpreting § 230(c)(1).  [(Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.Com, LLC, supra, 521 F.3d at p. 1174.)] 
 
One of Congres[s]’s purposes in enacting § 230(c) was to avoid the chilling 
effect of imposing liability on providers by both safeguarding the “diversity of 
political discourse ... and myriad avenues for intellectual activity” on the one 
hand, and “remov[ing] disincentives for the development and utilization of 
blocking and filtering technologies” on the other hand. §§ 230(a), (b); see 
also S.Rep. No. 104–230, at 86 (1996) (Conf.Rep.), available at 1996 WL 
54191, at *[194] (describing purpose of section 230 to protect providers from 
liability “for actions to restrict or to enable restrict[ion] of access to 
objectionable online material”). For that reason, “[C]lose cases ... must be 
resolved in favor of immunity, lest we cut the heart out of section 230 
....” [(Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 
supra, 521 F.3d at p. 1174.)] 
 
As illustrated by the case at bar, finding a bad faith exception to immunity under 
§ 230(c)(1) could force Yelp to defend its editorial decisions in the future on a 
case by case basis and reveal how it decides what to publish and what not to 
publish. Such exposure could lead Yelp to resist filtering out false/unreliable 
reviews (as someone could claim an improper motive for its decision), or to 
immediately remove all negative reviews about which businesses complained 
(as failure to do so could expose Yelp to a business’s claim that Yelp was 
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strong-arming the business for advertising money). The Ninth Circuit has made 
it clear that the need to defend against a proliferation of lawsuits, regardless of 
whether the provider ultimately prevails, undermines the purpose of section 
230. 
 
(Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., supra, 2011 WL 5079526, at *8-9.)  In the Court’s view, these concerns 
are particularly salient here, where the challenged services are by definition more curated than 
defendants’ core service and could not exist without more robust screening by defendants. 
 
 In opposition to defendants’ demurrer, Prager cites a number of cases that affirm the 
principle applied in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.Com, LLC, 
supra, 521 F.3d 1157, which held that a service provider is not entitled to CDA immunity with 
regard to content it develops itself.  However, this principle is inapposite here.  Prager does not 
allege that defendants developed any of Prager’s content or appended any commentary to it—
to the contrary, they allege the content became completely invisible in “Restricted Mode” or 
was simply demonetized.  Applying CDA immunity under these circumstances does not 
conflict with Roommates.  (See Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.Com, LLC, supra, 521 F.3d at p. 1163 [in enacting CDA immunity, “Congress 
sought to immunize the removal of user-generated content, not the creation of content”].)8 
 
 Finally, Prager contends that applying CDA immunity here would constitute an 
unlawful prior restraint on its speech in violation of the First Amendment.  However, a federal 
court has already held that defendants’ conduct does not violate the First Amendment, and this 
Court agrees with that analysis for the reasons discussed in connection with its analysis of 
Prager’s claim under the California Constitution.  Moreover, Prager does not allege that 
defendants prevented it from engaging in speech, even on their own platform—again, it 
contends that certain videos were excluded from “Restricted Mode” and/or were demonetized. 
 
 The Court consequently finds that section 230(c)(2)(B) bars Prager’s claims related to 
“Restricted Mode” and section 230(c)(1) bars all of its claims, with the possible exception of 
those based on its own promises and representations, which are discussed below.9 
 
 C.  Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing and Fraud 
 Under the UCL 
 
 Finally, Prager correctly urges that some California authority holds section 230(c)(1) of 
the CDA does not apply to claims based on a defendant’s own promises and representations to 
a plaintiff, rather than its role as a publisher.  (See Demetriades v. Yelp, Inc. (2014) 228 
Cal.App.4th 294, 313 [this immunity does not apply where “plaintiff seeks to hold Yelp liable 
for its own statements regarding the accuracy of its filter”]; but see Hassell v. Bird, supra, 5 
Cal.5th at p. 542 [disapproving of “creative pleading” in an attempt to avoid section 230 
immunity].)  This authority does not apply to the Court’s finding of immunity under section 
230(c)(2)(B).  In any event, Prager’s claims asserting this type of theory—namely, its claim for 
                                                 
8 Although it does not bring a claim for defamation, Prager appears to suggest that defendants have defamed it by 
removing its content from “Restricted Mode” or demonetizing it.  Such a claim would likely be foreclosed by the 
ruling in Bartholomew v. YouTube, LLC. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1217, 1234. 
9 The Court thus does not address defendants’ argument that Prager’s claims are barred by the First Amendment. 
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breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and its claim under the fraud 
prong of the UCL—do not state a cause of action.  
 
 Prager does not and cannot state a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing in light of the express provisions of YouTube’s Terms of Service, which 
provide that “YouTube reserves the right to remove Content without prior notice” and which 
also allow YouTube to “discontinue any aspect of the Service at any time.”  (See Declaration 
of Brian Willen, Ex. 1; Song fi Inc. v. Google, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2015) 108 F.Supp.3d 876, 885 
[plaintiff could not state a claim for violation of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
based on content removal in light of YouTube’s Terms of Service].)  Similarly, YouTube’s 
AdSense Terms of Service reserve the right “to refuse or limit your access to the Services.”  
(Declaration of Brian Willen, Ex. 8; see Sweet v. Google Inc. (N.D. Cal., Mar. 7, 2018, No. 17-
CV-03953-EMC) 2018 WL 1184777, at *9-10 [plaintiff could not state a claim for violation of 
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing based on demonitization in light of similar 
reservation of rights in YouTube’s Partner Program Terms].)  “[C]ourts are not at liberty to 
imply a covenant directly at odds with a contract’s express grant of discretionary power except 
in those relatively rare instances when reading the provision literally would, contrary to the 
parties’ clear intention, result in an unenforceable, illusory agreement.”  (Third Story Music, 
Inc. v. Waits (1995) 41 Cal.App.4th 798, 808.)  That is not the case here, and Prager does not 
contend that it is.  (See Sweet v. Google Inc., supra, 2018 WL 1184777, at *9-10 [applying 
Third Story].) 
 As to the UCL fraud claim, to the extent it is based on the “four essential freedoms” set 
forth above and similar statements, these statements are non-actionable puffery.  (See 
Demetriades v. Yelp, Inc., supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 311 [“ ‘a statement that is quantifiable, 
that makes a claim as to the “specific or absolute characteristics of a product,” may be an 
actionable statement of fact while a general, subjective claim about a product is non-actionable 
puffery,’ ” quoting Newcal Industries, Inc. v. Ikon Office Solution (9th Cir.2008) 513 F.3d 
1038, 1053]; Prager University v. Google LLC, supra, 2018 WL 1471939, at *11 [“None of 
the statements about YouTube’s viewpoint neutrality identified by Plaintiff resembles the kinds 
of ‘quantifiable’ statements about the ‘specific or absolute characteristics of a product’ that are 
actionable under the Lanham Act.”].)   
 Prager also alleges that defendants represented that “the ‘same standards apply equally 
to all’ when it comes to the content regulation on YouTube.”  (FAC, ¶ 85; see also id. at ¶ 13.)  
While this statement is arguably more than mere puffing (see Demetriades v. Yelp, Inc., supra, 
228 Cal.App.4th at p. 311-312), Prager does not allege that it suffered a loss of money or 
property as a result of its reliance on this statement.  “There are innumerable ways in which 
economic injury from unfair competition may be shown,” including where a plaintiff “ha[s] a 
present or future property interest diminished.”  (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (Benson) 
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 323; see also Alborzian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2015) 235 
Cal.App.4th 29, 38 [UCL “unlawful” plaintiffs established standing by alleging diminished 
credit score caused by defendant’s false negative reporting to credit agencies, even where they 
never made payments on the loan at issue].)  The “lost income, reduced viewership, and 
damage to brand, reputation, and goodwill” that Prager alleges (FAC, ¶ 157) would certainly 
satisfy this requirement if there were a causal connection between Prager’s alleged reliance on 
defendants’ statement in participating in the YouTube service and these harms.  However, 
these injuries cannot have resulted from Prager’s decision to use YouTube: they could only 
have been caused by YouTube’s later decisions to restrict and/or demonetize Prager’s content.  
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(See Prager University v. Google LLC, supra, 2018 WL 1471939, at *11-12 [“Plaintiff has not 
sufficiently alleged that it ‘has been or is likely to be injured as the result of the’ statements 
about YouTube’s viewpoint neutrality.  [Citation.]  As discussed above, any harm that Plaintiff 
suffered was caused by Defendants’ decisions to limit access to some of Plaintiff’s videos.”].)  
These later decisions by YouTube could not have been relied on by Prager.  (See id. at *11 
[“Although Plaintiff asserts that it has suffered injury in the form of ‘lower viewership, 
decreased ad revenue, a reduction in advertisers willing to purchase advertisements shown on 
Plaintiff’s videos, diverted viewership, and damage to its brand, reputation and goodwill,” … 
nothing in Plaintiff’s complaint suggests that this harm flowed directly from Defendants’ 
publication of their policies and guidelines. Instead, any harm that Plaintiff suffered was 
caused by Defendants’ decisions to limit access to some of Plaintiff’s videos ….”].)  Moreover, 
recognizing this theory would appear to conflict with principles of defamation law as recently 
discussed in Bartholomew v. YouTube, LLC. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1217. 
 Prager thus fails to state a cause of action based on the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing or the fraud prong of the UCL. 
 D.  Conclusion and Order 
 For all these reasons, the demurrer to the first through fourth causes of action is 
SUSTAINED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 
III.  Motion for Preliminary Injunction 
 As discussed above, Prager has not shown a reasonable probability of success on the 
merits in this action.  Its motion for a preliminary injunction is consequently DENIED.  (See 
San Francisco Newspaper Printing Co. v. Superior Court (Miller) (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 438, 
442.) 
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